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Liming Fang

Liming Fang contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

3 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Jailbreaking Commercial Black-Box LLMs with Explicitly Harmful Prompts

Existing black-box jailbreak attacks achieve certain success on non-reasoning models but degrade significantly on recent SOTA reasoning models. To improve attack ability, inspired by adversarial aggregation strategies, we integrate multiple jailbreak tricks into a single developer template. Especially, we apply Adversarial Context Alignment to purge semantic inconsistencies and use NTP (a type of harmful prompt) -based few-shot examples to guide malicious outputs, lastly forming DH-CoT attack with a fake chain of thought. In experiments, we further observe that existing red-teaming datasets include samples unsuitable for evaluating attack gains, such as BPs, NHPs, and NTPs. Such data hinders accurate evaluation of true attack effect lifts. To address this, we introduce MDH, a Malicious content Detection framework integrating LLM-based annotation with Human assistance, with which we clean data and build RTA dataset suite. Experiments show that MDH reliably filters low-quality samples and that DH-CoT effectively jailbreaks models including GPT-5 and Claude-4, notably outperforming SOTA methods like H-CoT and TAP.

preprint2026arXiv

LITMUS: Benchmarking Behavioral Jailbreaks of LLM Agents in Real OS Environments

The rapid proliferation of LLM-based autonomous agents in real operating system environments introduces a new category of safety risk beyond content safety: behavior jailbreak, where an adversary induces an agent to execute dangerous OS-level operations with irreversible consequences. Existing benchmarks either evaluate safety at the semantic layer alone, missing physical-layer harms, or fail to isolate test cases, letting earlier runs contaminate later ones. We present LITMUS (LLM-agents In-OS Testing for Measuring Unsafe Subversion), a benchmark addressing both gaps via a semantic-physical dual verification mechanism and OS-level state rollback. LITMUS comprises 819 high-risk test cases organized into one harmful seed subset and six attack-extended subsets covering three adversarial paradigms (jailbreak speaking, skill injection, and entity wrapping), plus a fully automated multi-agent evaluation framework judging behavior at both conversational and OS-level physical layers. Evaluation across frontier agents reveals three findings: (1) current agents lack effective safety awareness, with strong models (e.g., Claude Sonnet 4.6) still executing 40.64% of high-risk operations; (2) agents exhibit pervasive Execution Hallucination (EH), verbally refusing a request while the dangerous operation has already completed at the system level, invisible to every prior semantic-only framework; and (3) skill injection and entity wrapping attacks achieve high success rates, exposing pronounced agent vulnerabilities. LITMUS provides the first standardized platform for reproducible, physically grounded behavioral safety evaluation of LLM agents in real OS environments.

preprint2023arXiv

Cluster-guided Contrastive Graph Clustering Network

Benefiting from the intrinsic supervision information exploitation capability, contrastive learning has achieved promising performance in the field of deep graph clustering recently. However, we observe that two drawbacks of the positive and negative sample construction mechanisms limit the performance of existing algorithms from further improvement. 1) The quality of positive samples heavily depends on the carefully designed data augmentations, while inappropriate data augmentations would easily lead to the semantic drift and indiscriminative positive samples. 2) The constructed negative samples are not reliable for ignoring important clustering information. To solve these problems, we propose a Cluster-guided Contrastive deep Graph Clustering network (CCGC) by mining the intrinsic supervision information in the high-confidence clustering results. Specifically, instead of conducting complex node or edge perturbation, we construct two views of the graph by designing special Siamese encoders whose weights are not shared between the sibling sub-networks. Then, guided by the high-confidence clustering information, we carefully select and construct the positive samples from the same high-confidence cluster in two views. Moreover, to construct semantic meaningful negative sample pairs, we regard the centers of different high-confidence clusters as negative samples, thus improving the discriminative capability and reliability of the constructed sample pairs. Lastly, we design an objective function to pull close the samples from the same cluster while pushing away those from other clusters by maximizing and minimizing the cross-view cosine similarity between positive and negative samples. Extensive experimental results on six datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of CCGC compared with the existing state-of-the-art algorithms.