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Léonard Brice

Léonard Brice appears in the imported research catalog. Authorship, coauthor and topic links are available while profile ownership is still unclaimed.

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Computer Science and Game TheoryArtificial Intelligence

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Published work

4 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Multi-Environment POMDPs with Finite-Horizon Objectives

Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are systems in which one agent interacts with a stochastic environment, and receives only partial information about the current state. In a multi-environment POMDP (MEPOMDP), the initial state is unknown, and assumed to be adversarially chosen. In this work we focus on computing the optimal value and policy in MEPOMDPs with finite-horizon objectives. That problem is known to be PSPACE-complete in POMDPs. Our main results are as follows: (1) we establish that it is also PSPACE-complete in the more general setting of MEPOMDPs; (2) we present a practical algorithm and evaluate it on classical benchmarks, significantly outperforming the only previously known algorithm.

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preprint2022arXiv

On the Complexity of SPEs in Parity Games

We study the complexity of problems related to subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in infinite duration non zero-sum multiplayer games played on finite graphs with parity objectives. We present new complexity results that close gaps in the literature. Our techniques are based on a recent characterization of SPEs in prefix-independent games that is grounded on the notions of requirements and negotiation, and according to which the plays supported by SPEs are exactly the plays consistent with the requirement that is the least fixed point of the negotiation function. The new results are as follows. First, checking that a given requirement is a fixed point of the negotiation function is an NP-complete problem. Second, we show that the SPE constrained existence problem is NP-complete, this problem was previously known to be ExpTime-easy and NP-hard. Third, the SPE constrained existence problem is fixed-parameter tractable when the number of players and of colors are parameters. Fourth, deciding whether some requirement is the least fixed point of the negotiation function is complete for the second level of the Boolean hierarchy. Finally, the SPE-verification problem -- that is, the problem of deciding whether there exists a play supported by a SPE that satisfies some LTL formula -- is PSpace-complete, this problem was known to be ExpTime-easy and PSpace-hard.

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preprint2022arXiv

Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Mean-payoff Games

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with the least fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we show that the negotiation function is piecewise linear, and can be analyzed using the linear algebraic tool box. As a corollary, we prove the decidability of the SPE constrained existence problem, whose status was left open in the literature.

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