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Kazem Faghih

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Artificial Intelligence Computation and Language Cryptography and Security Information Retrieval Machine Learning

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preprint2026arXiv

Under the Hood of SKILL.md: Semantic Supply-chain Attacks on AI Agent Skill Registry

Autonomous AI agents increasingly extend their capabilities through Agent Skills: modular filesystem packages whose SKILL.md files describe when and how agents should use them. While this design enables scalable, on-demand capability expansion, it also introduces a semantic supply-chain risk in which natural-language metadata and instructions can affect which skills are admitted, surfaced, selected, and loaded. We study SKILL.md - only attacks across three registry-facing stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle, using real ClawHub skills and realistic registry mechanisms. In Discovery, short textual triggers can manipulate embedding-based retrieval and improve adversarial skill visibility, achieving up to 86% pairwise win rate and 80% Top-10 placement. In Selection, description-only framing biases agents toward functionally equivalent adversarial variants, which are selected in 77.6% of paired trials on average. In Governance, semantic evasion strategies cause malicious skills to avoid a blocking verdict in 36.5%-100% of cases. Overall, our results show that SKILL.md is not passive documentation but operational text that shapes which third-party capabilities agents find, trust, and use.

preprint2025arXiv

Quantifying Document Impact in RAG-LLMs

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances Large Language Models (LLMs) by connecting them to external knowledge, improving accuracy and reducing outdated information. However, this introduces challenges such as factual inconsistencies, source conflicts, bias propagation, and security vulnerabilities, which undermine the trustworthiness of RAG systems. A key gap in current RAG evaluation is the lack of a metric to quantify the contribution of individual retrieved documents to the final output. To address this, we introduce the Influence Score (IS), a novel metric based on Partial Information Decomposition that measures the impact of each retrieved document on the generated response. We validate IS through two experiments. First, a poison attack simulation across three datasets demonstrates that IS correctly identifies the malicious document as the most influential in $86\%$ of cases. Second, an ablation study shows that a response generated using only the top-ranked documents by IS is consistently judged more similar to the original response than one generated from the remaining documents. These results confirm the efficacy of IS in isolating and quantifying document influence, offering a valuable tool for improving the transparency and reliability of RAG systems.