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Kaixiang Zhao

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Artificial Intelligence Computer Vision Cryptography and Security Machine Learning

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preprint2026arXiv

FACTOR: Counterfactual Training-Free Test-Time Adaptation for Open-Vocabulary Object Detection

Open-vocabulary object detection often fails under distribution shifts, as it can be misled by spurious correlations between non-causal visual attributes (e.g., brightness, texture) and object categories. Existing test-time adaptation (TTA) methods either depend on costly online optimization or perform global calibration, overlooking the attribute-specific nature of these failures. To address this, we propose FACTOR (counterFACtual training-free Test-time adaptation for Open-vocabulaRy object detection), a lightweight framework grounded in counterfactual reasoning. By perturbing test images along non-causal attributes and comparing region-level predictions between original and counterfactual views, FACTOR quantifies attribute sensitivity, semantic relevance, and prediction variation to selectively suppress attribute-dependent predictions-without parameter updates. Experiments on PASCAL-C, COCO-C, and FoggyCityscapes show that FACTOR consistently outperforms prior TTA methods, demonstrating that explicit counterfactual reasoning effectively improves robustness under distribution shifts.

preprint2026arXiv

FRAME: Forensic Routing and Adaptive Multi-path Evidence Fusion for Image Manipulation Detection

The proliferation of sophisticated image editing tools and generative artificial intelligence models has made verifying the authenticity of digital images increasingly challenging, with important implications for journalism, forensic analysis, and public trust. Although numerous forensic algorithms, ranging from handcrafted methods to deep learning-based detectors, have been developed for manipulation detection, individual methods often suffer from limited robustness, fragmented evidence, or weak generalization across manipulation types and image conditions. To address these limitations, we present \textbf{FRAME}, a method for \textbf{F}orensic \textbf{R}outing and \textbf{A}daptive \textbf{M}ulti-path \textbf{E}vidence fusion for image manipulation detection. FRAME organizes diverse forensic algorithms into a multi-path analysis space, adaptively selects informative forensic paths for each input image, and fuses complementary evidence to improve detection and localization performance. By moving beyond single-method analysis and fixed fusion strategies, FRAME provides a more robust and flexible approach to image forensic reasoning while preserving interpretable forensic cues from multiple evidence sources. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of FRAME across diverse manipulation scenarios. Code is available at \href{https://github.com/kzhao5/FRAME}{https://github.com/kzhao5/FRAME}.

preprint2026arXiv

GraphIP-Bench: How Hard Is It to Steal a Graph Neural Network, and Can We Stop It?

Graph neural networks (GNNs) deployed as cloud services can be \emph{stolen} through \emph{model-extraction attacks}, which train a surrogate from query responses to reproduce the target's behaviour, and a growing line of ownership defenses tries to prevent or trace such theft. The title of this paper asks two questions: \emph{how hard is it to steal a GNN?}, and \emph{can we stop it?} Prior work cannot answer either, because experiments use inconsistent datasets, threat models, and metrics. We introduce \emph{GraphIP-Bench}, a unified benchmark which evaluates both sides under a single black-box protocol. It integrates twelve extraction attacks, twelve defenses spanning watermarking, output-perturbation, and query-pattern-detection families, ten public graphs covering homophilic, heterophilic, and large-scale regimes, three GNN backbones, and three graph-learning tasks, and it reports fidelity, task utility, ownership verification, and computational cost on shared splits, queries, and budgets. We further add a joint attack-and-defense track which runs every attack on every defended target and measures watermark verification on the resulting surrogate, which exposes the protection that a defense retains after extraction. The empirical picture is short: stealing a GNN is easy at medium query budgets and most defenses do not change this; several watermarks verify reliably on the protected model but lose most of their verification signal on the extracted surrogate, which exposes a gap that single-model evaluations miss; and heterophilic graphs are systematically harder to steal, while a cross-architecture mismatch between target and surrogate reduces but does not prevent extraction. Code: \href{https://github.com/LabRAI/GraphIP-Bench}{LabRAI/GraphIP-Bench}.

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