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Hyunsik Na

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Published work

3 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

An Empirical Study of Privacy Leakage Chains via Prompt Injection in Black-Box Chatbot Environments

LLM-based chatbot agents increasingly process user requests by combining natural-language reasoning with external tools such as web browsing. These capabilities improve usability, but they also create attack surfaces when untrusted external content is processed as part of a user' s task. This paper studies a privacy-leakage attack chain based on indirect prompt injection in black-box chatbot environments, where the attacker has no access to model weights, system prompts, or agent implementation details including how a trajectory is actually managed during its processing for a query. We first analyze how an attacker can hijack an agent' s intended task by crafting external content that appears benign to the victim while inducing the agent to execute an attacker-defined objective. We then evaluate a new prompt-injection technique, called exemplification, which uses a bridge in the external content to reframe the user prompt and the benign beginning of the retrieved page as few-shot examples before appending the attacker' s objective. We compare its attack success rate with a prior fake-completion technique. Finally, we demonstrate a proof-of-concept data-exfiltration chain using fictitious personal information in a controlled setting. Our results suggest that prompt injection, jailbreak-style instruction steering, and web-tool invocation can be combined into a feasible privacy-leakage path in deployed chatbot agents.

preprint2026arXiv

ReGraM: Region-First Knowledge Graph Reasoning for Medical Question Answering

Recent studies in medical question answering (Medical QA) have actively explored the integration of large language models (LLMs) with biomedical knowledge graphs (KGs) to improve factual accuracy. However, most existing approaches still rely on traversing the entire KG or performing large-scale retrieval, which introduces substantial noise and leads to unstable multi-hop reasoning. We argue that the core challenge lies not in expanding access to knowledge, but in identifying and reasoning over the appropriate subset of evidence for each query. ReGraM is a region-first knowledge graph reasoning framework that addresses this challenge by constructing a query-aligned subgraph and performing stepwise reasoning constrained to this localized region under multiple evidence aware modes. By focusing inference on only the most relevant portion of the KG, ReGraM departs from the assumption that all relations are equally useful an assumption that rarely holds in domain-specific medical settings. Experiments on seven medical QA benchmarks demonstrate that ReGraM consistently outperforms a strong baseline (KGARevion), achieving an 8.04% absolute accuracy gain on MCQ, a 4.50% gain on SAQ, and a 42.9% reduction in hallucination rate. Ablation and qualitative analyses further show that aligning region construction with hop-wise reasoning is the primary driver of these improvements. Overall, our results highlight region-first KG reasoning as an effective paradigm for improving factual accuracy and consistency in medical QA.

preprint2026arXiv

STAR: Detecting Inference-time Backdoors in LLM Reasoning via State-Transition Amplification Ratio

Recent LLMs increasingly integrate reasoning mechanisms like Chain-of-Thought (CoT). However, this explicit reasoning exposes a new attack surface for inference-time backdoors, which inject malicious reasoning paths without altering model parameters. Because these attacks generate linguistically coherent paths, they effectively evade conventional detection. To address this, we propose STAR (State-Transition Amplification Ratio), a framework that detects backdoors by analyzing output probability shifts. STAR exploits the statistical discrepancy where a malicious input-induced path exhibits high posterior probability despite a low prior probability in the model's general knowledge. We quantify this state-transition amplification and employ the CUSUM algorithm to detect persistent anomalies. Experiments across diverse models (8B-70B) and five benchmark datasets demonstrate that STAR exhibits robust generalization capabilities, consistently achieving near-perfect performance (AUROC $\approx$ 1.0) with approximately $42\times$ greater efficiency than existing baselines. Furthermore, the framework proves robust against adaptive attacks attempting to bypass detection.