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Hongli Xu

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Published work

5 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Adaptive and Fine-grained Module-wise Expert Pruning for Efficient LoRA-MoE Fine-Tuning

LoRA-MoE has emerged as an effective paradigm for parameter-efficient fine-tuning, combining the low training cost of LoRA with the increased adaptation capacity of Mixture-of-Experts (MoE). However, existing LoRA-MoE frameworks typically adopt a fixed and uniform expert configuration across heterogeneous Transformer modules (\eg, attention query/key projections and MLP gating networks), ignoring their distinct functional roles and capacity requirements. This design leads to localized over-provisioning, redundant trainable parameters, and unnecessary optimizer-state overhead. Moreover, prior methods enforce load balancing among experts throughout training. Although beneficial in the early stage, this constraint becomes restrictive once routing patterns stabilize, limiting expert specialization on downstream tasks. In this paper, we propose DMEP, a novel LoRA-MoE fine-tuning framework based on Dynamic Module-wise Expert Pruning. DMEP tracks expert utilization during training and physically removes low-utility experts on a per-module basis, yielding a more compact expert structure tailored to different modules. The pruned model then continues training without the load-balancing constraint, freeing the remaining experts to focus entirely on the downstream task and develop specialized expertise. By jointly adapting module-wise expert capacity and eliminating unnecessary balancing, DMEP improves both parameter efficiency and training efficiency. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks show that DMEP reduces trainable parameters by 35\%--43\% and improves training throughput by about 10\%, while maintaining or surpassing the downstream reasoning accuracy of uniform LoRA-MoE baselines.

preprint2016arXiv

Mutual Information Optimally Local Private Discrete Distribution Estimation

Consider statistical learning (e.g. discrete distribution estimation) with local $ε$-differential privacy, which preserves each data provider's privacy locally, we aim to optimize statistical data utility under the privacy constraints. Specifically, we study maximizing mutual information between a provider's data and its private view, and give the exact mutual information bound along with an attainable mechanism: $k$-subset mechanism as results. The mutual information optimal mechanism randomly outputs a size $k$ subset of the original data domain with delicate probability assignment, where $k$ varies with the privacy level $ε$ and the data domain size $d$. After analysing the limitations of existing local private mechanisms from mutual information perspective, we propose an efficient implementation of the $k$-subset mechanism for discrete distribution estimation, and show its optimality guarantees over existing approaches.

preprint2013arXiv

Near-Optimal Truthful Auction Mechanisms in Secondary Spectrum Markets

In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that will either maximize the social efficiency or maximize the revenue of the primary user. As the optimal conflict-free spectrum allocation problem is NP-hard, in this work, we design near optimal spectrum allocation mechanisms separately based on the following techniques: derandomized allocation from integer programming formulation, its linear programming (LP) relaxation, and the dual of the LP. We theoretically prove that 1) our near optimal allocation methods are bid monotone, which implys truthful auction mechanisms; and 2) our near optimal allocation methods can achieve a social efficiency or a revenue that is at least $1-\frac{1}{e}$ times of the optimal respectively. At last, we conduct extensive simulations to study the performances (social efficiency, revenue) of the proposed methods, and the simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.

preprint2013arXiv

PPS: Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Social-Efficient Spectrum Auction Mechanisms

Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving Strategyproof spectrum auction framework. Then, we design two schemes based on PPS separately for 1) the Single-Unit Auction model (SUA), where only single channel to be sold in the spectrum market; and 2) the Multi-Unit Auction model (MUA), where the primary user subleases multi-unit channels to the secondary users and each of the secondary users wants to access multi-unit channels either. Since the social efficiency maximization problem is NP-hard in both auction models, we present allocation mechanisms with approximation factors of $(1+ε)$ and 32 separately for SUA and MUA, and further judiciously design strategyproof auction mechanisms with privacy preserving based on them. Our extensive evaluations show that our mechanisms achieve good social efficiency and with low computation and communication overhead.

preprint2012arXiv

Truthful Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks

Secondary spectrum auction is widely applied in wireless networks for mitigating the spectrum scarcity. In a realistic spectrum trading market, the requests from secondary users often specify the usage of a fixed spectrum frequency band in a certain geographical region and require a duration time in a fixed available time interval. Considering the selfish behaviors of secondary users, it is imperative to design a truthful auction which matches the available spectrums and requests of secondary users optimally. Unfortunately, existing designs either do not consider spectrum heterogeneity or ignore the differences of required time among secondary users. In this paper, we address this problem by investigating how to use auction mechanisms to allocate and price spectrum resources so that the social efficiency can be maximized. We begin by classifying the spectrums and requests from secondary users into different local markets which ensures there is no interference between local markets, and then we can focus on the auction in a single local market. We first design an optimal auction based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to maximize the social efficiency while enforcing truthfulness. To reduce the computational complexity, we further propose a truthful sub-optimal auction with polynomial time complexity, which yields an approximation factor 6+4\surd2. Our extensive simulation results using real spectrum availability data show that the social efficiency ratio of the sub-optimal auction is always above 70% compared with the optimal auction.