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Researcher profile

Hadi Hosseini

Hadi Hosseini contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

ResearcherAffiliation not importedOpen to collaborate
Computer Science and Game Theoryecon.THMultiagent SystemsArtificial Intelligencecs.CYData Structures and AlgorithmsHuman-Computer InteractionInformation Retrieval

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Published work

11 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

The Pedagogy of AI Mistakes: Fostering Higher-Order Thinking

As generative AI becomes increasingly integrated into higher education, its frequent errors and hallucinations, often seen as limitations, offer a unique pedagogical opportunity. By framing AI as a ``learning companion'' whose imperfect outputs prompt analysis, evaluation, and reflection, we argue that instructors can engage students in the fundamental processes of higher-order thinking. This paper presents a design-oriented study in which an AI-integrated syllabus in a \textit{database design} course deliberately leverages AI's limitations to foster critical thinking and higher-order cognitive skills aligned with Bloom's taxonomy of learning. Using a mixed-methods approach, we examine how structured interaction with AI-generated errors supports metacognitive engagement, reinforces disciplinary rigor, and relates to students' perceived AI literacy and subject-matter competency.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2025arXiv

SP-Rank: A Dataset for Ranked Preferences with Secondary Information

We introduce $\mathbf{SP-Rank}$, the first large-scale, publicly available dataset for benchmarking algorithms that leverage both first-order preferences and second-order predictions in ranking tasks. Each datapoint includes a personal vote (first-order signal) and a meta-prediction of how others will vote (second-order signal), allowing richer modeling than traditional datasets that capture only individual preferences. SP-Rank contains over 12,000 human-generated datapoints across three domains -- geography, movies, and paintings, and spans nine elicitation formats with varying subset sizes. This structure enables empirical analysis of preference aggregation when expert identities are unknown but presumed to exist, and individual votes represent noisy estimates of a shared ground-truth ranking. We benchmark SP-Rank by comparing traditional aggregation methods that use only first-order votes against SP-Voting, a second-order method that jointly reasons over both signals to infer ground-truth rankings. While SP-Rank also supports models that rely solely on second-order predictions, our benchmarks emphasize the gains from combining both signals. We evaluate performance across three core tasks: (1) full ground-truth rank recovery, (2) subset-level rank recovery, and (3) probabilistic modeling of voter behavior. Results show that incorporating second-order signals substantially improves accuracy over vote-only methods. Beyond social choice, SP-Rank supports downstream applications in learning-to-rank, extracting expert knowledge from noisy crowds, and training reward models in preference-based fine-tuning pipelines. We release the dataset, code, and baseline evaluations (available at https://github.com/amrit19/SP-Rank-Dataset ) to foster research in human preference modeling, aggregation theory, and human-AI alignment.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Class Fairness in Online Matching

In the classical version of online bipartite matching, there is a given set of offline vertices (aka agents) and another set of vertices (aka items) that arrive online. When each item arrives, its incident edges -- the agents who like the item -- are revealed and the algorithm must irrevocably match the item to such agents. We initiate the study of class fairness in this setting, where agents are partitioned into a set of classes and the matching is required to be fair with respect to the classes. We adopt popular fairness notions from the fair division literature such as envy-freeness (up to one item), proportionality, and maximin share fairness to our setting. Our class versions of these notions demand that all classes, regardless of their sizes, receive a fair treatment. We study deterministic and randomized algorithms for matching indivisible items (leading to integral matchings) and for matching divisible items (leading to fractional matchings). We design and analyze three novel algorithms. For matching indivisible items, we propose an adaptive-priority-based algorithm, MATCH-AND-SHIFT, prove that it achieves 1/2-approximation of both class envy-freeness up to one item and class maximin share fairness, and show that each guarantee is tight. For matching divisible items, we design a water-filling-based algorithm, EQUAL-FILLING, that achieves (1-1/e)-approximation of class envy-freeness and class proportionality; we prove (1-1/e) to be tight for class proportionality and establish a 3/4 upper bound on class envy-freeness. Finally, we build upon EQUAL-FILLING to design a randomized algorithm for matching indivisible items, EQAUL-FILLING-OCS, which achieves 0.593-approximation of class proportionality. The algorithm and its analysis crucially leverage the recently introduced technique of online correlated selection (OCS) [Fahrbach et al., 2020].

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Fair Stable Matching Meets Correlated Preferences

The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint sets of agents wherein no pair of agents prefer each other to their matched partners. The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure that guarantees a stable matching for any input; however, its outcome may be unfair as it always favors one side by returning a matching that is optimal for one side (say men) and pessimal for the other side (say women). A desirable fairness notion is minimizing the sex-equality cost, i.e. the difference between the total rankings of both sides. Computing such stable matchings is a strongly NP-hard problem, which raises the question of what tractable algorithms to adopt in practice. We conduct a series of empirical evaluations on the properties of sex-equal stable matchings when preferences of agents on both sides are correlated. Our empirical results suggest that under correlated preferences, the DA algorithm returns stable matchings with low sex-equality cost, which further confirms its broad use in many practical applications.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Fairly Dividing Mixtures of Goods and Chores under Lexicographic Preferences

We study fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores among agents with \emph{lexicographic} preferences -- a subclass of additive valuations. In sharp contrast to the goods-only setting, we show that an allocation satisfying \emph{envy-freeness up to any item} (EFX) could fail to exist for a mixture of \emph{objective} goods and chores. To our knowledge, this negative result provides the \emph{first} counterexample for EFX over (any subdomain of) additive valuations. To complement this non-existence result, we identify a class of instances with (possibly subjective) mixed items where an EFX and Pareto optimal allocation always exists and can be efficiently computed. When the fairness requirement is relaxed to \emph{maximin share} (MMS), we show positive existence and computation for \emph{any} mixed instance. More broadly, our work examines the existence and computation of fair and efficient allocations both for mixed items as well as chores-only instances, and highlights the additional difficulty of these problems vis-{à}-vis their goods-only counterparts.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of m indivisible chores (items with non-positive value) to n agents. We consider the desirable fairness notion of 1-out-of-d maximin share (MMS) -- the minimum value that an agent can guarantee by partitioning items into d bundles and receiving the least valued bundle -- and focus on ordinal approximation of MMS that aims at finding the largest d <= n for which 1-out-of-d MMS allocation exists. Our main contribution is a polynomial-time algorithm for 1-out-of-floor(2n/3) MMS allocation, and a proof of existence of 1-out-of-floor(3n/4) MMS allocation of chores. Furthermore, we show how to use recently-developed algorithms for bin-packing to approximate the latter bound up to a logarithmic factor in polynomial time.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods

In fair division of indivisible goods, $\ell$-out-of-$d$ maximin share (MMS) is the value that an agent can guarantee by partitioning the goods into $d$ bundles and choosing the $\ell$ least preferred bundles. Most existing works aim to guarantee to all agents a constant fraction of their 1-out-of-$n$ MMS. But this guarantee is sensitive to small perturbation in agents&#39; cardinal valuations. We consider a more robust approximation notion, which depends only on the agents&#39; \emph{ordinal} rankings of bundles. We prove the existence of $\ell$-out-of-$\lfloor(\ell+\frac{1}{2})n\rfloor$ MMS allocations of goods for any integer $\ell\geq 1$, and present a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a $1$-out-of-$\lceil\frac{3n}{2}\rceil$ MMS allocation when $\ell = 1$. We further develop an algorithm that provides a weaker ordinal approximation to MMS for any $\ell > 1$.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

The Crawler: Three Equivalence Results for Object (Re)allocation Problems when Preferences Are Single-peaked

For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (2019) defines a new rule, the &#34;crawler&#34;, which also satisfies these three properties. (i) The crawler selects an allocation by &#34;visiting&#34; agents in a specific order. A natural &#34;dual&#34; rule can be defined by proceeding in the reverse order. Our first theorem states that the crawler and its dual are actually the same. (ii) Single-peakedness of a preference profile may in fact hold for more than one order and its reverse. Our second theorem states that the crawler is invariant to the choice of the order. (iii) For object allocation problems (as opposed to reallocation problems), we define a probabilistic version of the crawler by choosing an endowment profile at random according to a uniform distribution, and applying the original definition. Our third theorem states that this rule is the same as the &#34;random priority rule&#34;.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2022arXiv

Two for One $\&$ One for All: Two-Sided Manipulation in Matching Markets

Strategic behavior in two-sided matching markets has been traditionally studied in a &#34;one-sided&#34; manipulation setting where the agent who misreports is also the intended beneficiary. Our work investigates &#34;two-sided&#34; manipulation of the deferred acceptance algorithm where the misreporting agent and the manipulator (or beneficiary) are on different sides. Specifically, we generalize the recently proposed accomplice manipulation model (where a man misreports on behalf of a woman) along two complementary dimensions: (a) the two for one model, with a pair of misreporting agents (man and woman) and a single beneficiary (the misreporting woman), and (b) the one for all model, with one misreporting agent (man) and a coalition of beneficiaries (all women). Our main contribution is to develop polynomial-time algorithms for finding an optimal manipulation in both settings. We obtain these results despite the fact that an optimal one for all strategy fails to be inconspicuous, while it is unclear whether an optimal two for one strategy satisfies the inconspicuousness property. We also study the conditions under which stability of the resulting matching is preserved. Experimentally, we show that two-sided manipulations are more frequently available and offer better quality matches than their one-sided counterparts.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Fair Division of Time: Multi-layered Cake Cutting

We initiate the study of multi-layered cake cutting with the goal of fairly allocating multiple divisible resources (layers of a cake) among a set of agents. The key requirement is that each agent can only utilize a single resource at each time interval. Several real-life applications exhibit such restrictions on overlapping pieces; for example, assigning time intervals over multiple facilities and resources or assigning shifts to medical professionals. We investigate the existence and computation of envy-free and proportional allocations. We show that envy-free allocations that are both feasible and contiguous are guaranteed to exist for up to three agents with two types of preferences, when the number of layers is two. We also show that envy-free feasible allocations where each agent receives a polynomially bounded number of intervals exist for any number of agents and layers under mild conditions on agents&#39; preferences. We further devise an algorithm for computing proportional allocations for any number of agents and layers.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access
preprint2020arXiv

Fair Division through Information Withholding

Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods that addresses pairwise envy by the removal of at most one good. In the worst case, each pair of agents might require the (hypothetical) removal of a different good, resulting in a weak aggregate guarantee. We study allocations that are nearly envy-free in aggregate, and define a novel fairness notion based on information withholding. Under this notion, an agent can withhold (or hide) some of the goods in its bundle and reveal the remaining goods to the other agents. We observe that in practice, envy-freeness can be achieved by withholding only a small number of goods overall. We show that finding allocations that withhold an optimal number of goods is computationally hard even for highly restricted classes of valuations. In contrast to the worst-case results, our experiments on synthetic and real-world preference data show that existing algorithms for finding EF1 allocations withhold close-to-optimal number of goods.

0 citations0 reviewsNo code linkedOpen access