Researcher profile

Georgios Bakirtzis

Georgios Bakirtzis contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

5 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Controllability in preference-conditioned multi-objective reinforcement learning

Multi-objective reinforcement learning (MORL) allows a user to express preference over outcomes in terms of the relative importance of the objectives, but standard metrics cannot capture whether changes in preference reliably change the agent's behavior in the intended way, a property termed controllability. As a result, preference-conditioned agents can score well on standard MORL metrics while being insensitive to the preference input. If the ability to control agents cannot be reliably assessed, the symbolic interface that MORL provides between user intent and agent behavior is broken. Mainstream MORL metrics alone fail to measure the controllability of preference-conditioned agents, motivating a complementary metric specifically designed to that end. We hope the results spur discussion in the community on existing evaluation protocols to consolidate advances in preference adaptation in MORL to larger and more complex problems.

preprint2022arXiv

AlgebraicSystems: Compositional Verification for Autonomous System Design

Autonomous systems require the management of several model views to assure properties such as safety and security among others. A crucial issue in autonomous systems design assurance is the notion of emergent behavior; we cannot use their parts in isolation to examine their overall behavior or performance. Compositional verification attempts to combat emergence by implementing model transformation as structure-preserving maps between model views. AlgebraicDynamics relies on categorical semantics to draw relationships between algebras and model views. We propose AlgebraicSystems, a conglomeration of algebraic methods to assign semantics and categorical primitives to give computational meaning to relationships between models so that the formalisms and resulting tools are interoperable through vertical and horizontal composition.

preprint2022arXiv

STPA-driven Multilevel Runtime Monitoring for In-time Hazard Detection

Runtime verification or runtime monitoring equips safety-critical cyber-physical systems to augment design assurance measures and ensure operational safety and security. Cyber-physical systems have interaction failures, attack surfaces, and attack vectors resulting in unanticipated hazards and loss scenarios. These interaction failures pose challenges to runtime verification regarding monitoring specifications and monitoring placements for in-time detection of hazards. We develop a well-formed workflow model that connects system theoretic process analysis, commonly referred to as STPA, hazard causation information to lower-level runtime monitoring to detect hazards at the operational phase. Specifically, our model follows the DepDevOps paradigm to provide evidence and insights to runtime monitoring on what to monitor, where to monitor, and the monitoring context. We demonstrate and evaluate the value of multilevel monitors by injecting hazards on an autonomous emergency braking system model.

preprint2022arXiv

Yoneda Hacking: The Algebra of Attacker Actions

Our work focuses on modeling the security of systems from their component-level designs. Towards this goal, we develop a categorical formalism to model attacker actions. Equipping the categorical formalism with algebras produces two interesting results for security modeling. First, using the Yoneda lemma, we can model attacker reconnaissance missions. In this context, the Yoneda lemma shows us that if two system representations, one being complete and the other being the attacker's incomplete view, agree at every possible test, they behave the same. The implication is that attackers can still successfully exploit the system even with incomplete information. Second, we model the potential changes to the system via an exploit. An exploit either manipulates the interactions between system components, such as providing the wrong values to a sensor, or changes the components themselves, such as controlling a global positioning system (GPS). One additional benefit of using category theory is that mathematical operations can be represented as formal diagrams, helpful in applying this analysis in a model-based design setting. We illustrate this modeling framework using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) cyber-physical system model. We demonstrate and model two types of attacks (1) a rewiring attack, which violates data integrity, and (2) a rewriting attack, which violates availability.

preprint2021arXiv

Compositional Cyber-Physical Systems Modeling

Assuring the correct behavior of cyber-physical systems requires significant modeling effort, particularly during early stages of the engineering and design process when a system is not yet available for testing or verification of proper behavior. A primary motivation for `getting things right' in these early design stages is that altering the design is significantly less costly and more effective than when hardware and software have already been developed. Engineering cyber-physical systems requires the construction of several different types of models, each representing a different view, which include stakeholder requirements, system behavior, and the system architecture. Furthermore, each of these models can be represented at different levels of abstraction. Formal reasoning has improved the precision and expanded the available types of analysis in assuring correctness of requirements, behaviors, and architectures. However, each is usually modeled in distinct formalisms and corresponding tools. Currently, this disparity means that a system designer must manually check that the different models are in agreement. Manually editing and checking models is error prone, time consuming, and sensitive to any changes in the design of the models themselves. Wiring diagrams and related theory provide a means for formally organizing these different but related modeling views, resulting in a compositional modeling language for cyber-physical systems. Such a categorical language can make concrete the relationship between different model views, thereby managing complexity, allowing hierarchical decomposition of system models, and formally proving consistency between models.