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Davide Grossi

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Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory Logic in Computer Science Multiagent Systems Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing

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preprint2026arXiv

Swimming with Whales: Analysis of Power Imbalances in Stake-Weighted Governance

Voting methods weighted by stakes are the fundamental governance paradigm in Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains. Such a paradigm is known to be prone to power distortions: a few users possessing large stakes may completely control decision making, even without owning the totality of the stakes. We study this phenomenon through the lens of computational social choice, focusing on the extent of power imbalances in stake-weighted voting when power is quantified using the Penrose-Banzhaf power index. Our work presents both analytical and empirical contributions. Analytically, we demonstrate that while a perfect alignment between power and relative stake ownership is generally unattainable, it can be approximated in expectation under specific conditions. Empirically, using data from a real-world on-chain governance system (Project Catalyst), we provide a more fine-grained understanding of the power imbalances that are likely to occur in current stake-weighted governance systems.

preprint2022arXiv

Proportional Budget Allocations: Towards a Systematization

We contribute to the programme of lifting proportionality axioms from the multi-winner voting setting to participatory budgeting. We define novel proportionality axioms for participatory budgeting and test them on known proportionality-driven rules such as Phragmén and Rule X. We investigate logical implications among old and new axioms and provide a systematic overview of proportionality criteria in participatory budgeting.

preprint2022arXiv

Social Choice Around the Block: On the Computational Social Choice of Blockchain

One of the most innovative aspects of blockchain technology consists in the introduction of an incentive layer to regulate the behavior of distributed protocols. The designer of a blockchain system faces therefore issues that are akin to those relevant for the design of economic mechanisms, and faces them in a computational setting. From this perspective the present paper argues for the importance of computational social choice in blockchain research. It identifies a few challenges at the interface of the two fields that illustrate the strong potential for cross-fertilization between them.

preprint2021arXiv

Commonly Knowing Whether

This paper introduces the notion of `commonly knowing whether', a non-standard version of standard common knowledge which is defined on the basis of `knowing whether', instead of standard `knowing that'. After giving five possible definitions of this notion, we explore the logical relations among them in the single-agent and multi-agent cases. We propose a sound and complete axiomatization. We investigate one of the five definitions in terms of expressivity via a strategy of modal comparison games.

preprint2016arXiv

Epistemic Protocols for Distributed Gossiping

Gossip protocols aim at arriving, by means of point-to-point or group communications, at a situation in which all the agents know each other's secrets. We consider distributed gossip protocols which are expressed by means of epistemic logic. We provide an operational semantics of such protocols and set up an appropriate framework to argue about their correctness. Then we analyze specific protocols for complete graphs and for directed rings.

preprint2013arXiv

Ceteris Paribus Structure in Logics of Game Forms

The article introduces a ceteris paribus modal logic interpreted on the equivalence classes induced by sets of propositional atoms. This logic is used to embed two logics of agency and games, namely atemporal STIT and the coalition logic of propositional control (CL-PC). The embeddings highlight a common ceteris paribus structure underpinning the key modal operators of both logics, they clarify the relationship between STIT and CL-PC, and enable the transfer of complexity results to the ceteris paribus logic.