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Bowen Cao

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2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

GRAVITY: Architecture-Agnostic Structured Anchoring for Long-Horizon Conversational Memory

Long-horizon conversational agents rely on memory systems with increasingly sophisticated retrieval mechanisms. However, retrieved fragments are typically fed to the language model as unstructured text, lacking the relational, temporal, and thematic structures essential for complex reasoning. To bridge this reasoning gap, we introduce GRAVITY (\textbf{G}eneration-time \textbf{R}elational \textbf{A}nchoring \textbf{V}ia \textbf{I}njected \textbf{T}opological Memor\textbf{Y}), a plug-and-play structured memory module. GRAVITY extracts three complementary knowledge representations from raw conversational utterances: entity profiles grounded in relational graphs, temporal event tuples linked into causal traces, and cross-session topic summaries. At generation time, it injects these representations into the host system's prompt as structured anchoring contexts. This approach effectively synthesizes scattered evidence into a coherent, query-relevant context without requiring any architectural modifications to the host model. Extensive evaluations across five diverse memory systems on the LongMemEval and LoCoMo benchmarks demonstrate the efficacy of our approach. On average, GRAVITY improves LLM-judge accuracy by 7.5--10.1%. Gains are inversely correlated with baseline strength: the weakest host improves by 12.2% while the strongest still gains 3.8--5.7%. These findings establish structured context anchoring as a broadly effective, architecture-agnostic augmentation paradigm for long-horizon conversational memory.

preprint2020arXiv

Bias-based Universal Adversarial Patch Attack for Automatic Check-out

Adversarial examples are inputs with imperceptible perturbations that easily misleading deep neural networks(DNNs). Recently, adversarial patch, with noise confined to a small and localized patch, has emerged for its easy feasibility in real-world scenarios. However, existing strategies failed to generate adversarial patches with strong generalization ability. In other words, the adversarial patches were input-specific and failed to attack images from all classes, especially unseen ones during training. To address the problem, this paper proposes a bias-based framework to generate class-agnostic universal adversarial patches with strong generalization ability, which exploits both the perceptual and semantic bias of models. Regarding the perceptual bias, since DNNs are strongly biased towards textures, we exploit the hard examples which convey strong model uncertainties and extract a textural patch prior from them by adopting the style similarities. The patch prior is more close to decision boundaries and would promote attacks. To further alleviate the heavy dependency on large amounts of data in training universal attacks, we further exploit the semantic bias. As the class-wise preference, prototypes are introduced and pursued by maximizing the multi-class margin to help universal training. Taking AutomaticCheck-out (ACO) as the typical scenario, extensive experiments including white-box and black-box settings in both digital-world(RPC, the largest ACO related dataset) and physical-world scenario(Taobao and JD, the world' s largest online shopping platforms) are conducted. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed framework outperforms state-of-the-art adversarial patch attack methods.