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Alexandros Hollender contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.
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We study the query complexity of min-max optimization of a nonconvex-nonconcave function $f$ over $[0,1]^d \times [0,1]^d$. We show that, given oracle access to $f$ and to its gradient $\nabla f$, any algorithm that finds an $\varepsilon$-approximate stationary point must make a number of queries that is exponential in $1/\varepsilon$ or $d$.
We show $\textsf{EOPL}=\textsf{PLS}\cap\textsf{PPAD}$. Here the class $\textsf{EOPL}$ consists of all total search problems that reduce to the End-of-Potential-Line problem, which was introduced in the works by Hubacek and Yogev (SICOMP 2020) and Fearnley et al. (JCSS 2020). In particular, our result yields a new simpler proof of the breakthrough collapse $\textsf{CLS}=\textsf{PLS}\cap\textsf{PPAD}$ by Fearnley et al. (STOC 2021). We also prove a companion result $\textsf{SOPL}=\textsf{PLS}\cap\textsf{PPADS}$, where $\textsf{SOPL}$ is the class associated with the Sink-of-Potential-Line problem.
The complexity classes PPA-$k$, $k \geq 2$, have recently emerged as the main candidates for capturing the complexity of important problems in fair division, in particular Alon's Necklace-Splitting problem with $k$ thieves. Indeed, the problem with two thieves has been shown complete for PPA = PPA-2. In this work, we present structural results which provide a solid foundation for the further study of these classes. Namely, we investigate the classes PPA-$k$ in terms of (i) equivalent definitions, (ii) inner structure, (iii) relationship to each other and to other TFNP classes, and (iv) closure under Turing reductions.
The Hairy Ball Theorem states that every continuous tangent vector field on an even-dimensional sphere must have a zero. We prove that the associated computational problem of (a) computing an approximate zero is PPAD-complete, and (b) computing an exact zero is FIXP-hard. We also consider the Hairy Ball Theorem on toroidal instead of spherical domains and show that the approximate problem remains PPAD-complete. On a conceptual level, our PPAD-membership results are particularly interesting, because they heavily rely on the investigation of multiple-source variants of END-OF-LINE, the canonical PPAD-complete problem. Our results on these new END-OF-LINE variants are of independent interest and provide new tools for showing membership in PPAD. In particular, we use them to provide the first full proof of PPAD-completeness for the IMBALANCE problem defined by Beame et al. in 1998.
The classes PPA-$p$ have attracted attention lately, because they are the main candidates for capturing the complexity of Necklace Splitting with $p$ thieves, for prime $p$. However, these classes were not known to have complete problems of a topological nature, which impedes any progress towards settling the complexity of the Necklace Splitting problem. On the contrary, topological problems have been pivotal in obtaining completeness results for PPAD and PPA, such as the PPAD-completeness of finding a Nash equilibrium [Daskalakis et al., 2009, Chen et al., 2009b] and the PPA-completeness of Necklace Splitting with 2 thieves [Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg, 2019]. In this paper, we provide the first topological characterization of the classes PPA-$p$. First, we show that the computational problem associated with a simple generalization of Tucker's Lemma, termed $p$-polygon-Tucker, as well as the associated Borsuk-Ulam-type theorem, $p$-polygon-Borsuk-Ulam, are PPA-$p$-complete. Then, we show that the computational version of the well-known BSS Theorem [Barany et al., 1981], as well as the associated BSS-Tucker problem are PPA-$p$-complete. Finally, using a different generalization of Tucker's Lemma (termed $\mathbb{Z}_p$-star-Tucker), which we prove to be PPA-$p$-complete, we prove that $p$-thief Necklace Splitting is in PPA-$p$. This latter result gives a new combinatorial proof for the Necklace Splitting theorem, the only proof of this nature other than that of Meunier [2014]. All of our containment results are obtained through a new combinatorial proof for $\mathbb{Z}_p$-versions of Tucker's lemma that is a natural generalization of the standard combinatorial proof of Tucker's lemma by Freund and Todd [1981]. We believe that this new proof technique is of independent interest.
We consider the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions and explore the connection between two prominent fairness notions: maximum Nash welfare (MNW) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). We establish that an MNW allocation is always EFX as long as there are at most two possible values for the goods, whereas this implication is no longer true for three or more distinct values. As a notable consequence, this proves the existence of EFX allocations for these restricted valuation functions. While the efficient computation of an MNW allocation for two possible values remains an open problem, we present a novel algorithm for directly constructing EFX allocations in this setting. Finally, we study the question of whether an MNW allocation implies any EFX guarantee for general additive valuation functions under a natural new interpretation of approximate EFX allocations.
Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm operates by querying the best responses or the payoffs of the follower, who consequently can deceive the algorithm by responding as if his payoffs were much different than what they actually are. For this strategic behavior to be successful, the main challenge faced by the follower is to pinpoint the payoffs that would make the learning algorithm compute a commitment so that best responding to it maximizes the follower's utility, according to his true payoffs. While this problem has been considered before, the related literature only focused on the simplified scenario in which the payoff space is finite, thus leaving the general version of the problem unanswered. In this paper, we fill in this gap, by showing that it is always possible for the follower to compute (near-)optimal payoffs for various scenarios about the learning interaction between leader and follower.