Abstract

We prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute a Nash equilibrium in a tree polymatrix game with twenty actions per player. This is the first PPAD hardness result for a game with a constant number of actions per player where the interaction graph is acyclic. Along the way we show PPAD-hardness for finding an εε-fixed point of a 2D LinearFIXP instance, when εε is any constant less than (2−1)/2≈0.2071(\sqrt{2} - 1)/2 \approx 0.2071. This lifts the hardness regime from polynomially small approximations in kk-dimensions to constant approximations in two-dimensions, and our constant is substantial when compared to the trivial upper bound of 0.50.5.

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