Paper detail

The Meaning of Attack-Resistant Systems

In this paper, we introduce a formal notion of partial compliance, called Attack-resistance, of a computer program running together with a defense mechanism w.r.t a non-exploitability specification. In our setting, a program may contain exploitable vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows, but appropriate defense mechanisms built into the program or the operating system render such vulnerabilities hard to exploit by certain attackers, usually relying on the strength of the randomness of a probabilistic transformation of the environment or the program and some knowledge on the attacker's goals and attack strategy. We are motivated by the reality that most large-scale programs have vulnerabilities despite our best efforts to get rid of them. Security researchers have responded to this state of affairs by coming up with ingenious defense mechanisms such as address space layout randomization (ASLR) or instruction set randomization (ISR) that provide some protection against exploitation. However, implementations of such mechanism have been often shown to be insecure, even against the attacks they were designed to prevent. By formalizing this notion of attack-resistance we pave the way towards addressing the questions: "How do we formally analyze defense mechanisms? Is there a mathematical way of distinguishing effective defense mechanisms from ineffective ones? Can we quantify and show that these defense mechanisms provide formal security guarantees, albeit partial, even in the presence of exploitable vulnerabilities?". To illustrate our approach we discuss under which circumstances ISR implementations comply with the Attack-resistance definition.