Paper detail

The concept of free will as an infinite metatheoretic recursion

It is argued that the concept of free will, like the concept of truth in formal languages, requires a separation between an object level and a meta-level for being consistently defined. The Jamesian two-stage model, which deconstructs free will into the causally open "free" stage with its closure in the "will" stage, is implicitly a move in this direction. However, to avoid the dilemma of determinism, free will additionally requires an infinite regress of causal meta-stages, making free choice a hypertask. We use this model to define free will of the rationalist-compatibilist type. This is shown to provide a natural three-way distinction between quantum indeterminism, freedom and free will, applicable respectively to artificial intelligence (AI), animal agents and human agents. We propose that the causal hierarchy in our model corresponds to a hierarchy of Turing uncomputability. Possible neurobiological and behavioral tests to demonstrate free will experimentally are suggested. Ramifications of the model for physics, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, neuropathological medicine and moral philosophy are briefly outlined.