Paper detail

Serving by local consensus in the public service location game

We discuss the issue of distributed and cooperative decision-making in a network game of public service location. Each node of the network can choose to be a provider of service which is accessible to the provider itself and also to all the neighboring nodes. A node may also choose only to be a consumer, and then it has to pay a tax, and the collected tax is evenly distributed to all the service providers to remedy their cost. If nodes do not communicate with each other but make individual best-response decisions, the system will be trapped in an inefficient situation of high tax level. In this work we investigate a decentralized local-consensus selection mechanism, according to which nodes in need of service recommend their neighbors of highest local impact as candidate servers, and a node may become a server only if all its non-server neighbors give their assent. We demonstrate that this local-consensus mechanism, although only involving information exchange among neighboring nodes, leads to socially efficient solutions with tax level approaching the lowest possible value. Our results may help in understanding and improving collective problem-solving in various networked social systems and robotic systems.