Paper detail

Secure Adaptive Group Testing

\emph{Group Testing} (GT) addresses the problem of identifying a small subset of defective items from a large population, by grouping items into as few test pools as possible. In \emph{Adaptive GT} (AGT), outcomes of previous tests can influence the makeup of future tests. Using an information theoretic point of view, Aldridge $2012$ showed that in the regime of a few defectives, adaptivity does not help much, as the number of tests required is essentially the same as for non-adaptive GT. \emph{Secure GT} considers a scenario where there is an eavesdropper who may observe a fraction $δ$ of the tests results, yet should not be able to infer the status of the items. In the non-adaptive scenario, the number of tests required is $1/(1-δ)$ times the number of tests without the secrecy constraint. In this paper, we consider \emph{Secure Adaptive GT}. Specifically, when during the makeup of the pools one has access to a private feedback link from the lab, of rate $R_f$. We prove that the number of tests required for both correct reconstruction at the legitimate lab, with high probability, and negligible mutual information at the eavesdropper is $1/min\{1,1-δ+R_f\}$ times the number of tests required with no secrecy constraint. Thus, unlike non-secure GT, where an adaptive algorithm has only a mild impact, under a security constraint it can significantly boost performance. A key insight is that not only the adaptive link should disregard the actual test results and simply send keys, these keys should be enhanced through a "secret sharing" scheme before usage. We drive sufficiency and necessity bounds that completely characterizes the Secure Adaptive GT capacity.