Paper detail

Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information

In the classical prophet inequality, a gambler observes a sequence of stochastic rewards $V_1,...,V_n$ and must decide, for each reward $V_i$, whether to keep it and stop the game or to forfeit the reward forever and reveal the next value $V_i$. The gambler's goal is to obtain a constant fraction of the expected reward that the optimal offline algorithm would get. Recently, prophet inequalities have been generalized to settings where the gambler can choose $k$ items, and, more generally, where he can choose any independent set in a matroid. However, all the existing algorithms require the gambler to know the distribution from which the rewards $V_1,...,V_n$ are drawn. The assumption that the gambler knows the distribution from which $V_1,...,V_n$ are drawn is very strong. Instead, we work with the much simpler assumption that the gambler only knows a few samples from this distribution. We construct the first single-sample prophet inequalities for many settings of interest, whose guarantees all match the best possible asymptotically, \emph{even with full knowledge of the distribution}. Specifically, we provide a novel single-sample algorithm when the gambler can choose any $k$ elements whose analysis is based on random walks with limited correlation. In addition, we provide a black-box method for converting specific types of solutions to the related \emph{secretary problem} to single-sample prophet inequalities, and apply it to several existing algorithms. Finally, we provide a constant-sample prophet inequality for constant-degree bipartite matchings. We apply these results to design the first posted-price and multi-dimensional auction mechanisms with limited information in settings with asymmetric bidders.