Prisoners' Dilemma in Presence of Collective Dephasing

preprint2013arXivOpen access

Abstract

We quantize prisoner dilemma in presence of collective dephasing with dephasing rate γγ. It is shown that for two parameters set of strategies Q⊗QQ\otimes Q is Nash equilibrium below a cut-off value of time. Beyond this cut-off it bifurcates into two new Nash equilibria Q⊗DQ\otimes D and D⊗QD\otimes Q. Furthermore for maximum value of decoherence \ C⊗DC\otimes D and D⊗CD\otimes C also become Nash equilibria. At this stage the game has four Nash equilibria. On the other hand for three parameters set of strategies there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium however there is mixed strategy (non unique) Nash equilibrium that is not affected by collective dephasing..

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