Paper detail

Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization

We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in multi-dimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent bidders with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) demand constraints, appropriately extending Myerson's result to this setting. We also show that every feasible Bayesian auction can be implemented as a distribution over virtual VCG allocation rules. A virtual VCG allocation rule has the following simple form: Every bidder's type t_i is transformed into a virtual type f_i(t_i), via a bidder-specific function. Then, the allocation maximizing virtual welfare is chosen. Using this characterization, we show how to find and run the revenue-optimal auction given only black box access to an implementation of the VCG allocation rule. We generalize this result to arbitrarily correlated bidders, introducing the notion of a second-order VCG allocation rule. We obtain our reduction from revenue to welfare optimization via two algorithmic results on reduced forms in settings with arbitrary feasibility and demand constraints. First, we provide a separation oracle for determining feasibility of a reduced form. Second, we provide a geometric algorithm to decompose any feasible reduced form into a distribution over virtual VCG allocation rules. In addition, we show how to execute both algorithms given only black box access to an implementation of the VCG allocation rule. Our results are computationally efficient for all multi-dimensional settings where the bidders are additive. In this case, our mechanisms run in time polynomial in the total number of bidder types, but not type profiles. For generic correlated distributions, this is the natural description complexity of the problem. The runtime can be further improved to poly(#items, #bidders) in item-symmetric settings by making use of recent techniques.