Paper detail

On the complexity of strong Nash equilibrium: Hard-to-solve instances and smoothed complexity

The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions. The central solution concept in game theory is Nash equilibrium (NE). However, it fails to capture the possibility that agents can form coalitions (even in the 2-agent case). Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) refines NE to this setting. It is known that finding an SNE is NP-complete when the number of agents is constant. This hardness is solely due to the existence of mixed-strategy SNEs, given that the problem of enumerating all pure-strategy SNEs is trivially in P. Our central result is that, in order for a game to have at least one non-pure-strategy SNE, the agents' payoffs restricted to the agents' supports must, in the case of 2 agents, lie on the same line, and, in the case of n agents, lie on an (n - 1)-dimensional hyperplane. Leveraging this result, we provide two contributions. First, we develop worst-case instances for support-enumeration algorithms. These instances have only one SNE and the support size can be chosen to be of any size-in particular, arbitrarily large. Second, we prove that, unlike NE, finding an SNE is in smoothed polynomial time: generic game instances (i.e., all instances except knife-edge cases) have only pure-strategy SNEs.