On the Complexity of Constructive Control under Nearly Single-Peaked Preferences

We investigate the complexity of {\sc{Constructive Control by Adding/Deleting Votes}} (CCAV/CCDV) for $r$-approval, Condorcet, Maximin and Copeland$^α$ in $k$-axes and $k$-candidates partition single-peaked elections. In general, we prove that CCAV and CCDV for most of the voting correspondences mentioned above are NP-hard even when~$k$ is a very small constant. Exceptions are CCAV and CCDV for Condorcet and CCAV for $r$-approval in $k$-axes single-peaked elections, which we show to be fixed-parameter tractable with respect to~$k$. In addition, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing $2$-axes elections, resolving an open problem. Our work leads to a number of dichotomy results. To establish an NP-hardness result, we also study a property of $3$-regular bipartite graphs which may be of independent interest. In particular, we prove that for every $3$-regular bipartite graph, there are two linear orders of its vertices such that the two endpoints of every edge are consecutive in at least one of the two orders.

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