Paper detail

Mean Field Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) Games of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations

This paper studies a new class of dynamic optimization problems of large-population (LP) system which consists of a large number of negligible and coupled agents. The most significant feature in our setup is the dynamics of individual agents follow the forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) in which the forward and backward states are coupled at the terminal time. This current paper is hence different to most existing large-population literature where the individual states are typically modeled by the SDEs including the forward state only. The associated mean-field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) game, in its forward-backward sense, is also formulated to seek the decentralized strategies. Unlike the forward case, the consistency conditions of our forward-backward mean-field games involve six Riccati and force rate equations. Moreover, their initial and terminal conditions are mixed thus some special decoupling technique is applied here. We also verify the $ε$-Nash equilibrium property of the derived decentralized strategies. To this end, some estimates to backward stochastic system are employed. In addition, due to the adaptiveness requirement to forward-backward system, our arguments here are not parallel to those in its forward case.