Paper detail

Little Dragon Two: An efficient Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystem

In 1998 [8], Patarin proposed an efficient cryptosystem called Little Dragon which was a variant a variant of Matsumoto Imai cryptosystem C*. However Patarin latter found that Little Dragon cryptosystem is not secure [8], [3]. In this paper we propose a cryptosystem Little Dragon Two which is as efficient as Little Dragon cryptosystem but secure against all the known attacks. Like Little Dragon cryptosystem the public key of Little Dragon Two is mixed type that is quadratic in plaintext and cipher text variables. So the public key size of Little Dragon Two is equal to Little Dragon Cryptosystem. Our public key algorithm is bijective and can be used for both encryption and signatures.

preprint2010arXivOpen access

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