Paper detail

Leveraging Disentangled Representations to Improve Vision-Based Keystroke Inference Attacks Under Low Data

Keystroke inference attacks are a form of side-channel attacks in which an attacker leverages various techniques to recover a user's keystrokes as she inputs information into some display (e.g., while sending a text message or entering her pin). Typically, these attacks leverage machine learning approaches, but assessing the realism of the threat space has lagged behind the pace of machine learning advancements, due in-part, to the challenges in curating large real-life datasets. We aim to overcome the challenge of having limited number of real data by introducing a video domain adaptation technique that is able to leverage synthetic data through supervised disentangled learning. Specifically, for a given domain, we decompose the observed data into two factors of variation: Style and Content. Doing so provides four learned representations: real-life style, synthetic style, real-life content and synthetic content. Then, we combine them into feature representations from all combinations of style-content pairings across domains, and train a model on these combined representations to classify the content (i.e., labels) of a given datapoint in the style of another domain. We evaluate our method on real-life data using a variety of metrics to quantify the amount of information an attacker is able to recover. We show that our method prevents our model from overfitting to a small real-life training set, indicating that our method is an effective form of data augmentation, thereby making keystroke inference attacks more practical.