Paper detail

Last-iterate Convergence to Trembling-hand Perfect Equilibria

Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has several weaknesses, since it may prescribe to play sub-optimal actions in those parts of the game that are never reached at the equilibrium. NE refinements, such as the extensive-form perfect equilibrium (EFPE), amend such weaknesses by accounting for the possibility of players' mistakes. This is crucial in real-world applications, where bounded rationality players are usually involved, and it turns out being useful also in boosting the performances of superhuman agents for recreational games like Poker. Nevertheless, only few works addressed the problem of computing NE refinements. Most of them propose algorithms finding exact NE refinements by means of linear programming, and, thus, these do not have the potential of scaling up to real-world-size games. On the other hand, existing iterative algorithms that exploit the tree structure of sequential games only provide convergence guarantees to approximate refinements. In this paper, we provide the first efficient last-iterate algorithm that provably converges to an EFPE in two-player zero-sum sequential games with imperfect information. Our algorithm works by tracking a sequence of equilibria of suitably-defined, regularized-perturbed games. In order to do that, it uses a procedure that is tailored to converge last-iterate to the equilibria of such games. Crucially, the updates performed by such a procedure can be performed efficiently by visiting the game tree, thus making our algorithm potentially more scalable than its linear-programming-based competitors. Finally, we evaluate our algorithm on a standard testbed of games, showing that it produces strategies which are much more robust to players' mistakes than those of state-of-the-art NE-computation algorithms.