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Information Flow Safety in Multiparty Sessions

We consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels for messages. We propose a monitored semantics for this calculus, which blocks the execution of processes as soon as they attempt to leak information. We illustrate the use of our monitored semantics with various examples, and show that the induced safety property implies a noninterference property studied previously.

preprint2011arXivOpen access

Sara Capecchi Ilaria Castellani Mariangiola Dezani-Ciancaglini

Cryptography and Security

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Sara Capecchi Ilaria Castellani Mariangiola Dezani-Ciancaglini

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