Paper detail

Hallucination as Exploit: Evidence-Carrying Multimodal Agents

Multimodal agents use screenshots, documents, and webpages to choose tool calls. When a false visual claim triggers a click, email, extraction, or transfer, hallucination becomes an authorization failure rather than an answer-quality error. We formalize this failure mode as hallucination-to-action conversion: an unsupported perceptual claim supplies the precondition that makes a privileged action appear permitted. We propose evidence-carrying multimodal agents (ECA), which treat free-form model text as inadmissible evidence. ECA decomposes each tool call into action-critical predicates, obtains typed certificates from constrained DOM/OCR/AX verifiers, and lets a deterministic gate grant only the privileges those certificates support. The architecture does not hide perception error; it converts opaque model belief into named verifier, schema, and implementation residuals. Verifier red-teaming over 1,900 attacks exposes this residual directly: four targeted hardening steps reduce gate bypass from 15% to 1.3%. With content-derived certificates, ECA obtains 0% unsafe-action rate on a 200-task end-to-end pipeline (Wilson 95% upper bound 2.67%) and a 120-task browser proof-of-concept (upper bound 4.3%). A direct HACR audit on 500 stratified task keys shows that unsupported action-critical claims reach unsafe execution for naive agents (100.0%) and prompt-only defense (49.6%), but not for ECA. Oracle-certificate replay on 7,488 GPT-5.4 benchmark traces serves as a gate-correctness sanity check, and neural judge baselines remain bypassable under the same threat model. The resulting principle is simple: model language may propose actions, but external evidence must authorize them.