Paper detail

Green Power Control in Cognitive Wireless Networks

A decentralized network of cognitive and non-cognitive transmitters where each transmitter aims at maximizing his energy-efficiency is considered. The cognitive transmitters are assumed to be able to sense the transmit power of their non-cognitive counterparts and the former have a cost for sensing. The Stackelberg equilibrium analysis of this $2-$level hierarchical game is conducted, which allows us to better understand the effects of cognition on energy-efficiency. In particular, it is proven that the network energy-efficiency is maximized when only a given fraction of terminals are cognitive. Then, we study a sensing game where all the transmitters are assumed to take the decision whether to sense (namely to be cognitive) or not. This game is shown to be a weighted potential game and its set of equilibria is studied. Playing the sensing game in a first phase (e.g., of a time-slot) and then playing the power control game is shown to be more efficient individually for all transmitters than playing a game where a transmitter would jointly optimize whether to sense and his power level, showing the existence of a kind of Braess paradox. The derived results are illustrated by numerical results and provide some insights on how to deploy cognitive radios in heterogeneous networks in terms of sensing capabilities. Keywords: Power Control, Stackelberg Equilibrium, Energy-Efficiency.