Paper detail

Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem

We study fixation in large, but finite, populations with two types, and dynamics governed by birth-death processes. By considering a restricted class of such processes, we derive a continuous approximation for the probability of fixation that is valid beyond the weak-selection (WS) limit. From the continuous approximations, we then obtain asymptotic approximations for evolutionary dynamics with at most one equilibrium, in the selection-driven regime, that does not preclude a weak-selection regime. As an application, we study the fixation pattern when the infinite population limit has an interior Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS): (i) we show that the fixation pattern for the Hawk and Dove game satisfies what we term the one-half law: if the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is outside a small interval around $\sfrac{1}{2}$, the fixation is of dominance type; (ii) we also show that, outside of the weak-selection regime, the long-term dynamics of large populations can have very little resemblance to the infinite population case; in addition, we also present results for the case of two equilibria. Finally, we present continuous restatements valid for large populations of two classical concepts naturally defined in the discrete case: (i) the definition of an $\textsc{ESS}_N$ strategy; (ii) the definition of a risk-dominant strategy. We then present two applications of these restatements: (i) we obtain an asymptotic definition valid in the quasi-neutral regime that recovers both the one-third law under linear fitness and the generalised one-third law for $d$-player games; (ii) we extend the ideas behind the (generalised) one-third law outside the quasi-neutral regime and, as a generalisation, we introduce the concept of critical-frequency; (iii) we recover the classification of risk-dominant strategies for $d$-player games.