Paper detail

FedAttack: Effective and Covert Poisoning Attack on Federated Recommendation via Hard Sampling

Federated learning (FL) is a feasible technique to learn personalized recommendation models from decentralized user data. Unfortunately, federated recommender systems are vulnerable to poisoning attacks by malicious clients. Existing recommender system poisoning methods mainly focus on promoting the recommendation chances of target items due to financial incentives. In fact, in real-world scenarios, the attacker may also attempt to degrade the overall performance of recommender systems. However, existing general FL poisoning methods for degrading model performance are either ineffective or not concealed in poisoning federated recommender systems. In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective and covert poisoning attack method on federated recommendation, named FedAttack. Its core idea is using globally hardest samples to subvert model training. More specifically, the malicious clients first infer user embeddings based on local user profiles. Next, they choose the candidate items that are most relevant to the user embeddings as hardest negative samples, and find the candidates farthest from the user embeddings as hardest positive samples. The model gradients inferred from these poisoned samples are then uploaded to the server for aggregation and model update. Since the behaviors of malicious clients are somewhat similar to users with diverse interests, they cannot be effectively distinguished from normal clients by the server. Extensive experiments on two benchmark datasets show that FedAttack can effectively degrade the performance of various federated recommender systems, meanwhile cannot be effectively detected nor defended by many existing methods.