Paper detail

Eliminating Sandwich Attacks with the Help of Game Theory

Predatory trading bots lurking in Ethereum's mempool present invisible taxation of traders on automated market makers (AMMs). AMM traders specify a slippage tolerance to indicate the maximum price movement they are willing to accept. This way, traders avoid automatic transaction failure in case of small price movements before their trade request executes. However, while a too-small slippage tolerance may lead to trade failures, a too-large slippage tolerance allows predatory trading bots to profit from sandwich attacks. These bots can extract the difference between the slippage tolerance and the actual price movement as profit. In this work, we introduce the sandwich game to analyze sandwich attacks analytically from both the attacker and victim perspectives. Moreover, we provide a simple and highly effective algorithm that traders can use to set the slippage tolerance. We unveil that most broadcasted transactions can avoid sandwich attacks while simultaneously only experiencing a low risk of transaction failure. Thereby, we demonstrate that a constant auto-slippage cannot adjust to varying trade sizes and pool characteristics. Our algorithm outperforms the constant auto-slippage suggested by the biggest AMM, Uniswap, in all performed tests. Specifically, our algorithm repeatedly demonstrates a cost reduction exceeding a factor of 100.