Paper detail

Dynamic Models of Reputation and Competition in Job-Market Matching

A fundamental decision faced by a firm hiring employees - and a familiar one to anyone who has dealt with the academic job market, for example - is deciding what caliber of candidates to pursue. Should the firm try to increase its reputation by making offers to higher-quality candidates, despite the risk that the candidates might reject the offers and leave the firm empty-handed? Or should it concentrate on weaker candidates who are more likely to accept the offer? The question acquires an added level of complexity once we take into account the effect one hiring cycle has on the next: hiring better employees in the current cycle increases the firm's reputation, which in turn increases its attractiveness for higher-quality candidates in the next hiring cycle. These considerations introduce an interesting temporal dynamic aspect to the rich line of research on matching models for job markets, in which long-range planning and evolving reputational effects enter into the strategic decisions made by competing firms. We develop a model based on two competing firms to try capturing as cleanly as possible the elements that we believe constitute the strategic tension at the core of the problem: the trade-off between short-term recruiting success and long-range reputation-building; the inefficiency that results from underemployment of people who are not ranked highest; and the influence of earlier accidental outcomes on long-term reputations. Our model exhibits all these phenomena in a stylized setting, governed by a parameter q that captures the difference in strength between the two top candidates in each hiring cycle. We show that when q is relatively low the efficiency of the job market is improved by long-range reputational effects, but when q is relatively high, taking future reputations into account can sometimes reduce the efficiency.