Paper detail

Does set theory really ground arithmetic truth?

We consider the foundational relation between arithmetic and set theory. Our goal is to criticize the construction of standard arithmetic models as providing grounds for arithmetic truth (even in a relative sense). Our method is to emphasize the incomplete picture of both theories and treat models as their syntactical counterparts. Insisting on the incomplete picture will allow us to argue in favor of the revisability of the standard model interpretation. We then show that it is hopeless to expect that the relative grounding provided by a standard interpretation can resist being revisable. We start briefly characterizing the expansion of arithmetic truth provided by the interpretation in a set theory. Further, we show that, for every well-founded interpretation of recursive extensions of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted version of arithmetic has more theorems than the original. This theorem expansion is not complete however. We continue by defining the coordination problem. The problem can be summarized as follows. We consider two independent communities of mathematicians responsible for deciding over new axioms for ZF and PA. How likely are they to be coordinated regarding PAs interpretation in ZF? We prove that it is possible to have extensions of PA not interpretable in a given set theory ST. We further show that the probability of a random extension of arithmetic being interpretable in ST is zero.