Paper detail

Does observability amplify sensitivity to moral frames? Evaluating a reputation-based account of moral preferences

A growing body of work suggests that people are sensitive to moral framing in economic games involving prosociality, suggesting that people hold moral preferences for doing the "right thing". What gives rise to these preferences? Here, we evaluate the explanatory power of a reputation-based account, which proposes that people respond to moral frames because they are motivated to look good in the eyes of others. Across two pre-registered experiments (total N = 3,610), we investigated whether reputational incentives amplify sensitivity to framing effects. Both experiments manipulated (i) whether moral or neutral framing was used to describe a Trade-Off Game (in which participants chose between prioritizing equality or efficiency) and (ii) whether Trade-Off Game choices were observable to a social partner in a subsequent Trust Game. We find that framing effects are relatively insensitive to reputational incentives: observability did not significantly amplify sensitivity to moral framing. However, our results are not inconsistent with the possibility that observability has some amplification effect; quantitatively, the observed framing effect was 74% as large when decisions were private as when they were observable. These results suggest that moral frames may tap into moral preferences that are relatively deeply internalized, and that power of moral frames to promote prosociality may not be strongly enhanced by making the morally-framed behavior observable to others.