Paper detail

Corruption and Audit in Strategic Argumentation

Strategic argumentation provides a simple model of disputation and negotiation among agents. Although agents might be expected to act in our best interests, there is little that enforces such behaviour. (Maher, 2016) introduced a model of corruption and resistance to corruption within strategic argumentation. In this paper we identify corrupt behaviours that are not detected in that formulation. We strengthen the model to detect such behaviours, and show that, under the strengthened model, all the strategic aims in (Maher, 2016) are resistant to corruption.

preprint2020arXivOpen access
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