Paper detail

Composable security of measuring-Alice blind quantum computation

Blind quantum computing [A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and E. Kashefi, Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 517 (2009)] is a secure cloud quantum computing protocol which enables a client (who does not have enough quantum technology at her disposal) to delegate her quantum computation to a server (who has a universal quantum computer) without leaking any relevant information to the server. In [T. Morimae and K. Fujii, Phys. Rev. A {\bf87}, 050301(R) (2013)], a new blind quantum computing protocol, so called the measuring-Alice protocol, was proposed. This protocol offers several advantages over previous protocols, such as the device-independent security, less demanding requirements for the client, and a simpler and stronger security based on the no-signaling principle. In this paper, we show composable security of the measuring-Alice protocol by using the formalism of the constructive cryptography [U. Maurer, Proceedings of Theory of Security and Applications, TOSCA 2011, pages 33-56. Springer (2011)]. The above advantages of measuring-Alice protocol enable more intuitive and transparent proofs for the composable security.