Paper detail

Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design

In the classical experimental design setting, an experimenter E has access to a population of $n$ potential experiment subjects $i\in \{1,...,n\}$, each associated with a vector of features $x_i\in R^d$. Conducting an experiment with subject $i$ reveals an unknown value $y_i\in R$ to E. E typically assumes some hypothetical relationship between $x_i$'s and $y_i$'s, e.g., $y_i \approx βx_i$, and estimates $β$ from experiments, e.g., through linear regression. As a proxy for various practical constraints, E may select only a subset of subjects on which to conduct the experiment. We initiate the study of budgeted mechanisms for experimental design. In this setting, E has a budget $B$. Each subject $i$ declares an associated cost $c_i >0$ to be part of the experiment, and must be paid at least her cost. In particular, the Experimental Design Problem (EDP) is to find a set $S$ of subjects for the experiment that maximizes $V(S) = \log\det(I_d+\sum_{i\in S}x_i\T{x_i})$ under the constraint $\sum_{i\in S}c_i\leq B$; our objective function corresponds to the information gain in parameter $β$ that is learned through linear regression methods, and is related to the so-called $D$-optimality criterion. Further, the subjects are strategic and may lie about their costs. We present a deterministic, polynomial time, budget feasible mechanism scheme, that is approximately truthful and yields a constant factor approximation to EDP. In particular, for any small $δ> 0$ and $ε> 0$, we can construct a (12.98, $ε$)-approximate mechanism that is $δ$-truthful and runs in polynomial time in both $n$ and $\log\log\frac{B}{εδ}$. We also establish that no truthful, budget-feasible algorithms is possible within a factor 2 approximation, and show how to generalize our approach to a wide class of learning problems, beyond linear regression.