Paper detail

Budget-Constrained Contract Design for Effort-Averse Sensors in Averaging Based Estimation

Consider a group of effort-averse, or lazy, sensors that seek to minimize the effort invested to collect measurements of a variable. Increasing the effort invested by the sensors improves the quality of the measurements provided to the central planner but this incurs increased costs to the sensors. The central planner, which processes the sensor measurements, employs an averaging estimator. It also determines contracts for rewarding sensors based on the measurements obtained. The problem of designing a contract that yields an estimation-error based quality-of-service level in return for the reward extended to sensors is investigated in this paper. To this end, a game is formulated between the central planner and the sensors. Conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium are identified. The equilibrium is constructed explicitly and its properties in response to a reward based contract are studied. It turns out that the central planner, while not being able to directly measure the effort invested by the sensors, can enhance the estimation quality by rewarding each sensor based on the distance of its measurements from the output of the averaging estimator. Ultimately, optimal contracts are designed from the perspective of the budget required for achieving a specified level of estimation error.