Paper detail

Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers

For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to single buyer sub-problems. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly satisfies the following assumptions: (i) buyers' types must be distributed independently (not necessarily identically), (ii) objective function must be linearly separable over the buyers, and (iii) except for the supply constraints, there should be no other inter-buyer constraints. Our framework is general in the sense that it makes no explicit assumption about buyers' valuations, type distributions, and single buyer constraints (e.g., budget, incentive compatibility, etc). We present two generic multi buyer mechanisms which use single buyer mechanisms as black boxes; if an $α$-approximate single buyer mechanism can be constructed for each buyer, and if no buyer requires more than $\frac{1}{k}$ of all units of each item, then our generic multi buyer mechanisms are $γ_kα$-approximation of the optimal multi buyer mechanism, where $γ_k$ is a constant which is at least $1-\frac{1}{\sqrt{k+3}}$. Observe that $γ_k$ is at least 1/2 (for $k=1$) and approaches 1 as $k \to \infty$. As a byproduct of our construction, we present a generalization of prophet inequalities. Furthermore, as applications of our framework, we present multi buyer mechanisms with improved approximation factor for several settings from the literature.