Paper detail

Assumptions in Quantum Cryptography

Quantum cryptography uses techniques and ideas from physics and computer science. The combination of these ideas makes the security proofs of quantum cryptography a complicated task. To prove that a quantum-cryptography protocol is secure, assumptions are made about the protocol and its devices. If these assumptions are not justified in an implementation then an eavesdropper may break the security of the protocol. Therefore, security is crucially dependent on which assumptions are made and how justified the assumptions are in an implementation of the protocol. This thesis is primarily a review that analyzes and clarifies the connection between the security proofs of quantum-cryptography protocols and their experimental implementations. In particular, we focus on quantum key distribution: the task of distributing a secret random key between two parties. We provide a comprehensive introduction to several concepts: quantum mechanics using the density operator formalism, quantum cryptography, and quantum key distribution. We define security for quantum key distribution and outline several mathematical techniques that can either be used to prove security or simplify security proofs. In addition, we analyze the assumptions made in quantum cryptography and how they may or may not be justified in implementations. Along with the review, we propose a framework that decomposes quantum-key-distribution protocols and their assumptions into several classes. Protocol classes can be used to clarify which proof techniques apply to which kinds of protocols. Assumption classes can be used to specify which assumptions are justified in implementations and which could be exploited by an eavesdropper. Two contributions of the author are discussed: the security proofs of two two-way quantum-key-distribution protocols and an intuitive proof of the data-processing inequality.