A short note on the concept of free choice

We argue that the concepts of "freedom of choice" and of "causal order" are intrinsically linked: a choice is considered "free" if it is correlated only to variables in its causal future. We discuss the implications of this to Bell-type scenarios, where two separate measurements are carried out, neither of which lies in the causal future of the other, and where one typically assumes that the measurement settings are chosen freely. Furthermore, we refute a recent criticism made by Ghirardi and Romano in [arXiv:1301.5040] and [arXiv:1302.1635] that we used an unphysical freedom of choice assumption in our previous works, [Nat. Commun. 2, 411 (2011)] and [Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 150402 (2012)].

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