A Pricing Mechanism for Balancing the Charging of Ride-Hailing Electric Vehicle Fleets

preprint2022arXivOpen access

Abstract

Both ride-hailing services and electric vehicles are becoming increasingly popular and it is likely that charging management of the ride-hailing vehicles will be a significant part of the ride-hailing company's operation in the near future. Motivated by this, we propose a game theoretic model for charging management, where we assume that it is the fleet-operator that wants to minimize its operational cost, which among others include the price of charging. To avoid overcrowded charging stations, a central authority will design pricing policies to incentivize the vehicles to spread out among the charging stations, in a setting where several ride-hailing companies compete about the resources. We show that it is possible to construct pricing policies that make the Nash-equilibrium between the companies follow the central authority's target value when the desired load is feasible. Moreover, we provide a decentralized algorithm for computation of the equilibrium and conclude the paper with a numerical example illustrating the results.

Explore this paper’s authors, topics and related work.

Building this map preview

BZPEER is loading the nearby papers, people, topics and institutions for this page.

Reviews 0

Write a reviewWrite

No reviews yet.

Discussion 0

Add a commentWrite

No comments yet.