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A Matching Mechanism with Anticipatory Tolls for Congestion Pricing

This paper presents a matching mechanism for assigning drivers to routes where the drivers pay a toll for the marginal delay they impose on other drivers. The simple matching mechanism is derived from the RANKING algorithm for online bipartite matching proposed by Karp et al. [8]. The toll, which is anticipatory in design, is an adaption of one proposed by Dong et al. [5]. Our research proves that the matching mechanism proposed here is pareto user-optimal and can be adapted to give network optimal results for the minimizing total social cost of travel.

preprint2020arXivOpen access

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