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NoSEBrEaK - Attacking Honeynets

It is usually assumed that Honeynets are hard to detect and that attempts to detect or disable them can be unconditionally monitored. We scrutinize this assumption and demonstrate a method how a host in a honeynet can be completely controlled by an attacker without any substantial logging taking place.

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Related contextCo-authorshipCo-authorshipCo-authorshipAuthorshipAuthorshipAuthorshipTopic signalTopic signalWNoSEBrEaK - Attacking Honeynetspreprint / 2004AMaximillian DornseifResearcherAThorsten HolzResearcherAChristian N. KleinResearcherTCryptography and Security7258 worksTcs.CY4196 works
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NoSEBrEaK - Attacking Honeynets

preprint / 2004

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