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Tatsuya Sasaki

Tatsuya Sasaki contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

15 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

DetRefiner: Model-Agnostic Detection Refinement with Feature Fusion Transformer

Open-vocabulary object detection (OVOD) aims to detect both seen and unseen categories, yet existing methods often struggle to generalize to novel objects due to limited integration of global and local contextual cues. We propose DetRefiner, a simple yet effective plug-and-play framework that learns to fuse global and local features to refine open-vocabulary detection. DetRefiner processes global image features and patch-level image features from foundational models (e.g., DINOv3) through a lightweight Transformer encoder. The encoder produces a class vector capturing image-level attributes and patch vectors representing local region attributes, from which attribute reliability is inferred to recalibrate the base model's confidence. Notably, DetRefiner is trained independently of the base OVOD model, requiring neither access to its internal features nor retraining. At inference, it operates solely on the base detector's predictions, producing auxiliary calibration scores that are merged with the base detector's scores to yield the final refined confidence. Despite this simplicity, DetRefiner consistently enhances multiple OVOD models across COCO, LVIS, ODinW13, and Pascal VOC, achieving gains of up to +10.1 AP on novel categories. These results highlight that learning to fuse global and local representations offers a powerful and general mechanism for advancing open-world object detection. Our codes and models are available at https://github.com/hitachi-rd-cv/detrefiner.

preprint2026arXiv

Integrated strong reciprocity enables productive punishment and protective defection

Cooperation in large groups and one-shot interactions is often hindered by freeloading. Punishment can enforce cooperation, but it is usually regarded as wasteful because the costs of punishing offset its benefits. Here, we analyze an evolutionary game model that integrates upstream and downstream reciprocity with costly punishment: integrated strong reciprocity (ISR). We demonstrate that ISR admits a stable mixed equilibrium of ISR and unconditional defection (ALLD), and that costly punishment can become productive: When sufficiently efficient, it raises collective welfare above the no-punishment baseline. ALLD players persist as evolutionary shields, preventing invasion by unconditional cooperation (ALLC) or alternative conditional strategies (e.g., antisocial punishment). At the same time, the mixed equilibrium of ISR and ALLD remains robust under modest complexity costs that destabilize other symmetric cooperative systems.

preprint2026arXiv

Integrating upstream and downstream reciprocity stabilizes cooperator-defector coexistence in others-only public goods games

Human cooperation persists among strangers in large, well-mixed populations despite theoretical predictions of difficulties, leaving a fundamental evolutionary puzzle. While upstream (pay-it-forward: helping others because you were helped) and downstream (rewarding-reputation: helping those with good reputations) indirect reciprocity have been independently considered as solutions, their joint dynamics in multiplayer contexts remain unexplored. We study public goods games without self-return (often called "others-only" PGGs) with benefit b and cost c and analyze evolutionary dynamics for three strategies: unconditional cooperation (ALLC), unconditional defection (ALLD), and an integrated reciprocity strategy combining unconditional forwarding with reputation-based discrimination. We show that integrating upstream and downstream reciprocity can yield a globally asymptotically stable mixed equilibrium of ALLD and integrated reciprocators when b/c > 2 in the absence of complexity costs. We analytically derive a critical threshold for complexity costs. If cognitive demands exceed this threshold, the stable equilibrium disappears via a saddle-node bifurcation. Otherwise, within the stable regime, complexity costs counterintuitively stabilize the equilibrium by preventing not only ALLC but also alternative conditional strategies from invading. Rather than requiring uniformity, our model reveals one pathway to stable cooperation through strategic diversity. ALLD serves as "evolutionary shields" preventing system collapse while integrated reciprocators flexibly combine open and discriminative responses. This framework demonstrates how pay-it-forward broadcasting and reputation systems can jointly maintain social polymorphism including cooperation despite cognitive limitations and group size challenges, offering a potential evolutionary foundation for behavioral diversity in human societies.

preprint2016arXiv

Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment

Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to being rejected by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the most leading social norms we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes locally stable.

preprint2016arXiv

Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games

Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation in large populations of strangers. In a typical situation, a consensus-building process hardly succeeds due to lack of face and standing. The evolution of cooperation in this type of situation is studied using threshold public good games in which cooperation prevails when it is initially sufficient, or otherwise, it perishes. While punishment is a powerful tool to shape human behaviours, institutional punishment is often too costly to start with only a few contributors, which is another coordination problem. Here we show that whatever the initial conditions, reward funds based on voluntary contribution can evolve. The voluntary reward paves the way for effectively overcoming the coordination problem and efficiently transforms freeloaders to cooperators with a perceived small risk of collective failure.

preprint2015arXiv

Cheating is evolutionarily assimilated with cooperation in the continuous snowdrift game

It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals choosing to contribute in continuous degrees can result in the social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% contribution through so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical studies have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the loss of diversity in strategy. Here we analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions are clarified under which gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of those with 100% contribution and those with 0% contribution to merge into one species with an intermediate contribution level. The key finding is that the continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of different cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this implies that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could cause conflicts that are based on commonly accepted notions of fairness.

preprint2015arXiv

Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement

Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.

preprint2015arXiv

Unchecked strategy diversification and collapse in continuous voluntary public good games

Cooperation or defection and participation or withdrawal are well-known options of behavior in game-like activities in free societies, yet the co-evolutionary dynamics of these behavioral traits in the individual level are not well understood. Here we investigate the continuous voluntary public good game, in which individuals have two types of continuous-valued options: a probability of joining the public good game and a level of cooperative investment in the game. Our numerical results reveal hitherto unreported phenomena: (i) The evolutionary dynamics are initially characterized by oscillations in individual cooperation and participation levels, in contrast to the population-level oscillations that have previously been reported. (ii) Eventually, the population's average cooperation and participation levels converge to and stabilize at a center. (iii) Then, a most peculiar phenomenon unfolds: The strategies present in the population diversify and give rise to a "cloud" of tinkering individuals who each tries out a different strategy, and this process continues unchecked as long as the population's cooperation and participation levels remain balanced. Over time, however, imbalances build up as a consequence of random drift and there is a sudden and abrupt collapse of the strategy-diversity cloud. The process then repeats again in a cyclic manner. To understand the three aforementioned phenomena, we investigate the system analytically using adaptive-dynamics techniques. Our analysis casts light on the mechanisms which underpin the unexpected and surprising evolutionary dynamics.

preprint2015arXiv

Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations

Punishment is a popular tool when governing commons in situations where free riders would otherwise take over. It is well known that sanctioning systems, such as the police and courts, are costly and thus can suffer from those who free ride on other's efforts to maintain the sanctioning systems (second-order free riders). Previous game-theory studies showed that if populations are very large, pool punishment rarely emerges in public good games, even when participation is optional, because of second-order free riders. Here we show that a matching fund for rewarding cooperation leads to the emergence of pool punishment, despite the presence of second-order free riders. We demonstrate that reward funds can pave the way for a transition from a population of free riders to a population of pool punishers. A key factor in promoting the transition is also to reward those who contribute to pool punishment, yet not abstaining from participation. Reward funds eventually vanish in raising pool punishment, which is sustainable by punishing the second-order free riders. This suggests that considering the interdependence of reward and punishment may help to better understand the origins and transitions of social norms and institutions.

preprint2013arXiv

Band-edge Exciton States in a Single-walled Carbon Nanotube Revealed by Magneto-optical Spectroscopy in Ultra-high Magnetic Field

We report high field magneto-optical study on the first and second sub-band transitions of single-chirality single-walled carbon nanotubes. The ordering and relative energy splitting between bright and dark excitonic states were found to be inverse between the first and second subbands. We verified that the zero-momentum dark singlet exciton lies below the bright exciton for the first subband transitions, while for the second sub-band transitions, it was found to have higher energy than the bright excitonic state. Effect of this peculiar excitonic structure was found to manifest itself in distinctive Aharonov-Bohm splitting in ultra-high magnetic fields up to 190 T.

preprint2013arXiv

Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity

Stern-judging is one of the best-known assessment rules in indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity is a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. It relies on mutual monitoring and assessments, i.e., individuals judge, following their own assessment rules, whether other individuals are "good" or "bad" according to information on their past behaviors. Among many assessment rules, stern-judging is known to provide stable cooperation in a population, as observed when all members in the population know all about others' behaviors (public information case) and when the members never commit an assessment error. In this paper, the effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging is investigated. By analyzing the image matrix, which describes who is good in the eyes of whom in the population, we analytically show that private information and assessment error cause the collapse of stern-judging: all individuals assess other individuals as "good" at random with a probability of 1/2.

preprint2013arXiv

Exciton-phonon Bound Complex in Single-walled Carbon Nanotubes Revealed by High-field Magneto-optical Spectroscopy

High-field magneto-optical spectroscopy was conducted on highly-selected chiral (6,5) specific single-walled carbon nanotubes. Spectra of phonon sidebands in both 1st and 2nd sub-bands were observed to be unchanged by the application of an external magnetic field up to 52 T. Our analyses led to the conclusion that both phonon sidebands in respective sub-band originate from the dark K-momentum singlet (D-K-S) excitons. Moreover, while the relative ordering between the bandedge bright exciton and its zero-momentum anti-bonding counterpart was found to be opposite for the 1st and 2nd sub-bands, the relative ordering between the D-K-S exciton and the band-edge bright exciton was clarified to be the same for both sub-bands. Energy of these D-K-S excitons was estimated to be ~ 21.5 and ~ 37.3 meV above the band-edge bright exciton for the 1st and 2nd sub-bands, respectively.

preprint2013arXiv

Survey of Exciton-Phonon Sidebands by Magneto-optical Spectroscopy Using Highly Purified (6,5) Single-walled Carbon Nanotubes

We report the first high-field magneto-optical study on the exciton-phonon sideband of single-walled carbon nanotubes (SWNTs) consisting only of (6,5) species. Both energy and intensity of the observed phonon sideband were found to be independent of the external magnetic field. Comparing with theoretical calculations, we confirmed that these sidebands originate from the optically forbidden K-momentum singlet excitons. Energy of these K-momentum dark excitons was extracted to be ~ 21.5 meV above the bright zero-momentum singlet excitons, in close agreement with recent theoretical predictions and experimentally determined values.

preprint2013arXiv

The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation

Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently, Sasaki et al. (2012, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:1165-1169) considered optional participation as well as institutional incentives and described how the interplay between these mechanisms affects the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Here, we present a full classification of these evolutionary dynamics. Specifically, whenever penalties are large enough to cause the bi-stability of both cooperation and defection in cases in which participation in the public good game is compulsory, these penalties will ultimately result in cooperation if participation in the public good game is optional. The global stability of coercion-based cooperation in this optional case contrasts strikingly with the bi-stability that is observed in the compulsory case. We also argue that optional participation is not so effective at improving cooperation under rewards.

preprint2012arXiv

The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion

The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First, a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders, and second, natural selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the presence of non-punishing cooperators (namely, "second-order" freeriders). We present a game-theoretical model of social exclusion in which a punishing cooperator can exclude freeriders from benefit sharing. We show that such social exclusion can overcome the above-mentioned difficulties even if it is costly and stochastic. The results do not require a genetic relationship, repeated interaction, reputation, or group selection. Instead, only a limited number of freeriders are required to prevent the second-order freeriders from eroding the social immune system.