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Reshabh K Sharma

Reshabh K Sharma contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Learning Correct Behavior from Examples: Validating Sequential Execution in Autonomous Agents

As autonomous agents become increasingly sophisticated, validating their sequential behavior presents a significant challenge. Traditional testing approaches require manual specification, exact sequence matching, or thousands of training examples. We present a novel algorithm that automatically learns correct behavior from just 2-10 passing execution traces and validates new executions against this learned model. Our approach combines dominator analysis from compiler theory with multimodal large language model-powered semantic understanding to identify essential states and handle non-deterministic behavior. The system constructs a generalized ground truth model using Prefix Tree Acceptors, merges traces through multi-tiered equivalence detection, and validates new executions via topological subsequence matching. In controlled experiments, our system achieved high accuracy in detecting product bugs and false successes using only 3 training traces. This approach provides explainable validation results with coverage metrics and works across diverse domains including UI testing, code generation, and robotic processes.

preprint2026arXiv

SplittingSecrets: A Compiler-Based Defense for Preventing Data Memory-Dependent Prefetcher Side-Channels

Traditional side-channels take advantage of secrets being used as inputs to unsafe instructions, used for memory accesses, or used in control flow decisions. Constant-time programming, which restricts such code patterns, has been widely adopted as a defense against these vulnerabilities. However, new hardware optimizations in the form of Data Memory-dependent Prefetchers (DMP) present in Apple, Intel, and ARM CPUs have shown such defenses are not sufficient. These prefetchers, unlike classical prefetchers, use the content of memory as well as the trace of prior accesses to determine prefetch targets. An adversary abusing such a prefetcher has been shown to be able to mount attacks leaking data-at-rest; data that is never used by the program, even speculatively, in an unsafe manner. In response, this paper introduces SplittingSecrets, a compiler-based tool that can harden software libraries against side-channels arising from DMPs. SplittingSecrets's approach avoids reasoning about the complex internals of different DMPs and instead relies on one key aspect of all DMPs: activation requires data to resemble addresses. To prevent secret data from leaking, SplittingSecrets transforms memory operations to ensure that secrets are never stored in memory in a manner resembling an address, thereby avoiding DMP activation on those secrets. Rather than disable a DMP entirely, SplittingSecrets can provide targeted hardening for only specific secrets entirely in software. We have implemented SplittingSecrets using LLVM, supporting both source-level memory operations and those generated by the compiler backend for the AArch64 architecture, We have analyzed the performance overhead involved in safeguarding secrets from DMP-induced attacks using common primitives in libsodium, a popular cryptographic library when built for Apple M-series CPUs.