Researcher profile

Maria Apostolaki

Maria Apostolaki contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

3 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

Worst-Case Discovery and Runtime Protection for RL-Based Network Controllers

RL-based controllers achieve strong average-case performance in networking tasks such as congestion control and adaptive bitrate streaming. Yet their performance can degrade severely under network conditions where strong performance is still achievable. Identifying such conditions and quantifying the resulting performance gap is intractable by enumeration, while the sequential and closed-loop nature of RL controllers makes formal verification methods impractical. We present ReGuard, a framework that discovers worst-case scenarios for a given RL controller and protects it against them at inference time without retraining. Discovery is formulated as a bilevel regret-maximization problem, which yields a certified lower bound on the worst-case performance gap. The discovered trajectories are then analyzed as counterfactuals and compiled into lightweight logic rules that intervene only when a risky state is detected, leaving the controller's behavior unchanged otherwise. We evaluate ReGuard across three RL-based network controllers: Pensieve, Sage, and Park. ReGuard discovers scenarios in which the controller's performance is 43$-$64% worse than what is achievable. ReGuard not only discovers gaps 57% to 6$\times$ larger than those found by the strongest baselines but also shrinks them by 79$-$85% via lightweight rule-based protection while preserving nominal performance. ReGuard's protection extends beyond the scenarios it discovers, improving performance across a wider range of network conditions.

preprint2023arXiv

CANE: A Cascade-Control Approach for Network-Assisted Video QoE Management

Prior efforts have shown that network-assisted schemes can improve the Quality-of-Experience (QoE) and QoE fairness when multiple video players compete for bandwidth. However, realizing network-assisted schemes in practice is challenging, as: i) the network has limited visibility into the client players' internal state and actions; ii) players' actions may nullify or negate the network's actions; and iii) the players' objectives might be conflicting. To address these challenges, we formulate network-assisted QoE optimization through a cascade control abstraction. This informs the design of CANE, a practical network-assisted QoE framework. CANE uses machine learning techniques to approximate each player's behavior as a black-box model and model predictive control to achieve a near-optimal solution. We evaluate CANE through realistic simulations and show that CANE improves multiplayer QoE fairness by ~50% compared to pure client-side adaptive bitrate algorithms and by ~20% compared to uniform traffic shaping.

preprint2020arXiv

Securing Internet Applications from Routing Attacks

Attacks on Internet routing are typically viewed through the lens of availability and confidentiality, assuming an adversary that either discards traffic or performs eavesdropping. Yet, a strategic adversary can use routing attacks to compromise the security of critical Internet applications like Tor, certificate authorities, and the bitcoin network. In this paper, we survey such application-specific routing attacks and argue that both application-layer and network-layer defenses are essential and urgently needed. While application-layer defenses are easier to deploy in the short term, we hope that our work serves to provide much needed momentum for the deployment of network-layer defenses.