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Makoto Yokoo

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Artificial Intelligence Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity Multiagent Systems

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preprint2026arXiv

MenuNet: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Matching Markets

Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice and labor market clearing. In practice, however, these markets are invariably governed by complex distributional constraints, ranging from diversity quotas and regional balance to global capacity slacks, under which stable matchings often fail to exist. This raises a fundamental question: how to distribute unavoidable instability across agents while preserving strategy-proofness? To address this, we propose \texttt{MenuNet}, a strategy-proof mechanism design framework based on a neural representation of menus. Rather than directly constructing assignments, \texttt{MenuNet} learns to generate personalized probabilistic menus, from which assignments are realized via a structured sequential choice rule that guarantees strategy-proofness by construction. By decomposing stability into fairness (no envy) and non-wastefulness, our approach models these properties as vector-valued quantities and optimizes their distribution through differentiable objectives, providing a principled trade-off between competing axioms. Empirically, \texttt{MenuNet} navigates this trade-off effectively: it consistently outperforms Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) in terms of envy and Deferred Acceptance (DA) in terms of waste, while maintaining scalability and computational efficiency. These results suggest that learning-based menu mechanisms provide a flexible and scalable paradigm for mechanism design in highly constrained, real-world environments.

preprint2019arXiv

New Algorithms for Functional Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems

The Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) formulation is a powerful tool to model multi-agent coordination problems that are distributed by nature. The formulation is suitable for problems where variables are discrete and constraint utilities are represented in tabular form. However, many real-world applications have variables that are continuous and tabular forms thus cannot accurately represent constraint utilities. To overcome this limitation, researchers have proposed the Functional DCOP (F-DCOP) model, which are DCOPs with continuous variables. But existing approaches usually come with some restrictions on the form of constraint utilities and are without quality guarantees. Therefore, in this paper, we (i) propose exact algorithms to solve a specific subclass of F-DCOPs; (ii) propose approximation methods with quality guarantees to solve general F-DCOPs; and (iii) empirically show that our algorithms outperform existing state-of-the-art F-DCOP algorithms on randomly generated instances when given the same communication limitations.

preprint2016arXiv

DisCSPs with Privacy Recast as Planning Problems for Utility-based Agents

Privacy has traditionally been a major motivation for decentralized problem solving. However, even though several metrics have been proposed to quantify it, none of them is easily integrated with common solvers. Constraint programming is a fundamental paradigm used to approach various families of problems. We introduce Utilitarian Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problems (UDisCSP) where the utility of each state is estimated as the difference between the the expected rewards for agreements on assignments for shared variables, and the expected cost of privacy loss. Therefore, a traditional DisCSP with privacy requirements is viewed as a planning problem. The actions available to agents are: communication and local inference. Common decentralized solvers are evaluated here from the point of view of their interpretation as greedy planners. Further, we investigate some simple extensions where these solvers start taking into account the utility function. In these extensions we assume that the planning problem is further restricting the set of communication actions to only the communication primitives present in the corresponding solver protocols. The solvers obtained for the new type of problems propose the action (communication/inference) to be performed in each situation, defining thereby the policy.

preprint2016arXiv

Utilitarian Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems

Privacy has been a major motivation for distributed problem optimization. However, even though several methods have been proposed to evaluate it, none of them is widely used. The Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) is a fundamental model used to approach various families of distributed problems. As privacy loss does not occur when a solution is accepted, but when it is proposed, privacy requirements cannot be interpreted as a criteria of the objective function of the DCOP. Here we approach the problem by letting both the optimized costs found in DCOPs and the privacy requirements guide the agents' exploration of the search space. We introduce Utilitarian Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (UDCOP) where the costs and the privacy requirements are used as parameters to a heuristic modifying the search process. Common stochastic algorithms for decentralized constraint optimization problems are evaluated here according to how well they preserve privacy. Further, we propose some extensions where these solvers modify their search process to take into account their privacy requirements, succeeding in significantly reducing their privacy loss without significant degradation of the solution quality.

preprint2013arXiv

A Dynamic Programming Model for Determining Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions: Quasi-linear Utility and Budget Constraints

In this paper, we develop a new method for finding an optimal biddingstrategy in sequential auctions, using a dynamic programming technique. Theexisting method assumes that the utility of a user is represented in anadditive form. Thus, the remaining endowment of money must be explicitlyrepresented in each state, and the calculation of the optimal biddingstrategy becomes time-consuming when the initial endowment of money mbecomes large.In this paper, we develop a new problem formalization that avoids explicitlyrepresenting the remaining endowment, by assuming the utility of a user canbe represented in a quasi-linear form, and representing the payment as astate-transition cost. Experimental evaluations show that we can obtainmore than an m-fold speed-up in the computation time. Furthermore, we havedeveloped a method for obtaining a semi-optimal bidding strategy underbudget constraints, and have experimentally confirmed the efficacy of thismethod.

preprint2011arXiv

False-name-proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team

We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purchase a feasible solution by conducting an auction. Our goal is to design auctions that are truthful and false-name-proof, meaning that it is in the agents' best interest to reveal ownership of all elements (which may not be known to the auctioneer a priori) as well as their true incurred costs. We first propose and analyze a false-name-proof mechanism for the special case where each agent owns only one element in reality, but may pretend that this element is in fact a set of multiple elements. We prove that its frugality ratio is bounded by $2^n$, which, up to constants, matches a lower bound of $Ω(2^n)$ for all false-name-proof mechanisms in this scenario. We then propose a second mechanism for the general case in which agents may own multiple elements. It requires the auctioneer to choose a reserve cost a priori, and thus does not always purchase a solution. In return, it is false-name-proof even when agents own multiple elements. We experimentally evaluate the payment (as well as social surplus) of the second mechanism through simulation.