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Liyi Zhou

Liyi Zhou contributes to research discovery and scholarly infrastructure.

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Published work

5 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

AI Agent Smart Contract Exploit Generation

Smart contract vulnerabilities have led to billions in losses, yet finding actionable exploits remains challenging. Traditional fuzzers rely on rigid heuristics and struggle with complex attacks, while human auditors are thorough but slow and don't scale. Large Language Models offer a promising middle ground, combining human-like reasoning with machine speed. Early studies show that simply prompting LLMs generates unverified vulnerability speculations with high false positive rates. To address this, we present A1, an agentic system that transforms any LLM into an end-to-end exploit generator. A1 provides agents with six domain-specific tools for autonomous vulnerability discovery, from understanding contract behavior to testing strategies on real blockchain states. All outputs are concretely validated through execution, ensuring only profitable proof-of-concept exploits are reported. We evaluate A1 across 36 real-world vulnerable contracts on Ethereum and Binance Smart Chain. A1 achieves a 63% success rate on the VERITE benchmark. Across all successful cases, A1 extracts up to \$8.59 million per exploit and \$9.33 million total. Using Monte Carlo analysis of historical attacks, we demonstrate that immediate vulnerability detection yields 86-89% success probability, dropping to 6-21% with week-long delays. Our economic analysis reveals a troubling asymmetry: attackers achieve profitability at \$6,000 exploit values while defenders require \$60,000 -- raising fundamental questions about whether AI agents inevitably favor exploitation over defense.

preprint2026arXiv

Can Agent Benchmarks Support Their Scores? Evidence-Supported Bounds for Interactive-Agent Evaluation

Interactive agent benchmarks map an agent run to a binary outcome through outcome checks. When these checks rely on surface level signals or fail to capture the agent's actual action path, they cannot reliably determine whether the run succeeded. For example, a benchmark task may ask whether Alice's shipping address was changed, while the outcome check only verifies that the agent clicked "Save." This does not guarantee that the intended state change occurred, since the agent may have modified the wrong record. Treating such a run as successful therefore makes the reported score misleading. Benchmark quality thus depends not only on task design, but also on the reliability of outcome detection. We address this problem by introducing an outcome evidence reporting layer for existing benchmarks, without modifying their tasks, agents, or evaluators. The layer performs three functions. First, before scoring, it specifies which stored artifacts are required to verify the claimed outcome for each case. Second, it applies a locked checklist to each completed run and assigns one of three evidence labels: Evidence Pass, Evidence Fail, or Unknown. Third, it reports evidence supported score bounds that quantify uncertainty arising from Unknown cases. Rather than silently counting, discarding, or hiding uncertain cases inside a single aggregate success rate, the framework keeps them explicitly visible. We evaluate the outcome evidence layer on five public benchmarks: ANDROIDWORLD, AGENTDOJO, APPWORLD, tau3 bench retail, and MINIWOB. The resulting reports separate several empirically distinct failure modes.

preprint2026arXiv

When Agents Overtrust Environmental Evidence: An Extensible Agentic Framework for Benchmarking Evidence-Grounding Defects in LLM Agents

Large language model agents increasingly operate through environment-facing scaffolds that expose files, web pages, APIs, and logs. These observations influence tool use, state tracking, and action sequencing, yet their reliability and authority are often uncertain. Environmental grounding is therefore a systems-level problem involving context admission, evidence provenance, freshness checking, verification policy, action gating, and model reasoning. Existing agent benchmarks mainly evaluate task capability or specific attacks such as prompt injection and memory poisoning, but they under-specify a fundamental reliability question: whether agents remain grounded in the true environment state when observations are stale, incorrect, or malicious. We introduce EnvTrustBench, an agentic framework for benchmarking this failure mode. We define an evidence-grounding defect (EGD) as a behavioral failure in which an agent treats an environment-facing claim as sufficient evidence for action without resolving it against available current evidence, leading to a task-incorrect false path under the true environment state. Given a task scenario, EnvTrustBench generates the workspace, environment, agent-facing objective, and validation oracle, executes the evaluated agent, records its action-observation trajectory and final state, and applies the oracle to produce a verdict. Using 6 LLM backbones and 5 widely used scaffolds, we evaluate 55 generated cases across 11 task scenarios, with each scenario expanded through five feedback-guided generation iterations. Results show that EGDs consistently emerge across operational workflows, highlighting environmental grounding as a core agent reliability problem with important security implications.

preprint2022arXiv

Cyclic Arbitrage in Decentralized Exchanges

Decentralized Exchanges (DEXes) enable users to create markets for exchanging any pair of cryptocurrencies. The direct exchange rate of two tokens may not match the cross-exchange rate in the market, and such price discrepancies open up arbitrage possibilities with trading through different cryptocurrencies cyclically. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation on cyclic arbitrages in DEXes. We propose a theoretical framework for studying cyclic arbitrage. With our framework, we analyze the profitability conditions and optimal trading strategies of cyclic transactions. We further examine exploitable arbitrage opportunities and the market size of cyclic arbitrages with transaction-level data of Uniswap V2. We find that traders have executed 292,606 cyclic arbitrages over eleven months and exploited more than 138 million USD in revenue. However, the revenue of the most profitable unexploited opportunity is persistently higher than 1 ETH (4,000 USD), which indicates that DEX markets may not be efficient enough. By analyzing how traders implement cyclic arbitrages, we find that traders can utilize smart contracts to issue atomic transactions and the atomic implementations could mitigate users' financial loss in cyclic arbitrage from the price impact.

preprint2021arXiv

On the Just-In-Time Discovery of Profit-Generating Transactions in DeFi Protocols

In this paper, we investigate two methods that allow us to automatically create profitable DeFi trades, one well-suited to arbitrage and the other applicable to more complicated settings. We first adopt the Bellman-Ford-Moore algorithm with DEFIPOSER-ARB and then create logical DeFi protocol models for a theorem prover in DEFIPOSER-SMT. While DEFIPOSER-ARB focuses on DeFi transactions that form a cycle and performs very well for arbitrage, DEFIPOSER-SMT can detect more complicated profitable transactions. We estimate that DEFIPOSER-ARB and DEFIPOSER-SMT can generate an average weekly revenue of 191.48ETH (76,592USD) and 72.44ETH (28,976USD) respectively, with the highest transaction revenue being 81.31ETH(32,524USD) and22.40ETH (8,960USD) respectively. We further show that DEFIPOSER-SMT finds the known economic bZx attack from February 2020, which yields 0.48M USD. Our forensic investigations show that this opportunity existed for 69 days and could have yielded more revenue if exploited one day earlier. Our evaluation spans 150 days, given 96 DeFi protocol actions, and 25 assets. Looking beyond the financial gains mentioned above, forks deteriorate the blockchain consensus security, as they increase the risks of double-spending and selfish mining. We explore the implications of DEFIPOSER-ARB and DEFIPOSER-SMT on blockchain consensus. Specifically, we show that the trades identified by our tools exceed the Ethereum block reward by up to 874x. Given optimal adversarial strategies provided by a Markov Decision Process (MDP), we quantify the value threshold at which a profitable transaction qualifies as Miner ExtractableValue (MEV) and would incentivize MEV-aware miners to fork the blockchain. For instance, we find that on Ethereum, a miner with a hash rate of 10% would fork the blockchain if an MEV opportunity exceeds 4x the block reward.