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Chenglin Yang

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2 published item(s)

preprint2026arXiv

AgentTrust: Runtime Safety Evaluation and Interception for AI Agent Tool Use

Modern AI agents execute real-world side effects through tool calls such as file operations, shell commands, HTTP requests, and database queries. A single unsafe action, including accidental deletion, credential exposure, or data exfiltration, can cause irreversible harm. Existing defenses are incomplete: post-hoc benchmarks measure behavior after execution, static guardrails miss obfuscation and multi-step context, and infrastructure sandboxes constrain where code runs without understanding what an action means. We present AgentTrust, a runtime safety layer that intercepts agent tool calls before execution and returns a structured verdict: allow, warn, block, or review. AgentTrust combines a shell deobfuscation normalizer, SafeFix suggestions for safer alternatives, RiskChain detection for multi-step attack chains, and a cache-aware LLM-as-Judge for ambiguous inputs. We release a 300-scenario benchmark across six risk categories and an additional 630 independently constructed real-world adversarial scenarios. On the internal benchmark, the production-only ruleset achieves 95.0% verdict accuracy and 73.7% risk-level accuracy at low-millisecond end-to-end latency. On the 630-scenario benchmark, evaluated under a patched ruleset and not claimed as zero-shot, AgentTrust achieves 96.7% verdict accuracy, including about 93% on shell-obfuscated payloads. AgentTrust is released under the AGPL-3.0 license and provides a Model Context Protocol server for MCP-compatible agents.

preprint2020arXiv

PatchAttack: A Black-box Texture-based Attack with Reinforcement Learning

Patch-based attacks introduce a perceptible but localized change to the input that induces misclassification. A limitation of current patch-based black-box attacks is that they perform poorly for targeted attacks, and even for the less challenging non-targeted scenarios, they require a large number of queries. Our proposed PatchAttack is query efficient and can break models for both targeted and non-targeted attacks. PatchAttack induces misclassifications by superimposing small textured patches on the input image. We parametrize the appearance of these patches by a dictionary of class-specific textures. This texture dictionary is learned by clustering Gram matrices of feature activations from a VGG backbone. PatchAttack optimizes the position and texture parameters of each patch using reinforcement learning. Our experiments show that PatchAttack achieves > 99% success rate on ImageNet for a wide range of architectures, while only manipulating 3% of the image for non-targeted attacks and 10% on average for targeted attacks. Furthermore, we show that PatchAttack circumvents state-of-the-art adversarial defense methods successfully.